South American Regional Countering Transregional-Transnational Threats Seminar

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Summary Proceedings¹

by Stephen Meyer, Celina Realuyo and Boris Saavedra

The nations of South America face increasingly formidable security challenges from transnational-transregional threat networks that have regional and global reach without boundaries. Military and security forces must recognize and confront these threats, understanding that it takes a network to defeat a network. The William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies (WJPC) provides academic space to address these issues affecting the security of the Western Hemisphere in an enriching environment. To that end, and as a follow-up to U.S. Southern Command’s

¹ These summary proceedings reflect the discussions conducted under Chatham House Rule of the September 26-28, 2017 William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies South American Regional Seminar on Countering Transregional-Transnational Threats in Lima, Peru.
South American Defense Conference (SOUTHDEC) in August 2017, the Perry Center co-hosted, with the Peruvian Ministry of Defense, a South American Regional Countering Transregional-Transnational Threats Seminar, for eight South American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela) in Lima, Peru from 26-28 September 2017.

Day One of the seminar focused on strategic-level perspectives on security threats to the Americas and on counterterrorism, with regional perspectives provided by Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay and the U.S. Day Two began with an examination of the Peruvian Counter-Crime Strategy in the VRAE/M (Valley of the Rivers Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro) and an overview of the U.S. Strategy to Counter Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC), then examined the role of the military and police in citizen security in Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. Subsequently, Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela and U.S. Southern Command shared their country perspectives on Transnational Organized Crime and Illicit Trafficking in the Americas. Day Three addressed cybersecurity and emerging technologies, followed by a panel discussion on promoting inclusive security in the Americas and the challenges faced by women in defense and security institutions, with participation by females from Argentina, Chile and Peru. Two separate panels examined national and regional strategies to counter transnational-transregional threat networks (CT3N), including discussion of strategies by Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay.

DAY ONE

Regional Security and Counterterrorism

I. Peruvian Perspective on Security Threats to the Americas: Shared Responsibility

Security can only be attained through shared responsibility by all the citizens of a country, both men and women. In 1971, a world without illicit drugs was promised by world leaders, but that promise has not been fulfilled. On the contrary, harmful drugs are proliferating everywhere, so we are not doing something right. There are no simple solutions, and each country and region has their own problem set. Judgments on how to address these problem sets must be based on hard evidence, not individual prejudices. In Peru, for example, cultivation and trafficking of narcotics is fought in the VRAE, but traffickers operate in many other locations. Production of drugs occurs in different places, using chemicals imported from abroad, so it is not only a VRAE problem. Also, a lot of money is made from these drugs and financial networks to process the proceeds are required. Financial intelligence is necessary to track the flow of funds, and stronger regulations are needed to regulate that flow. Some of that money is used to influence elections, mostly outside the VRAE. While some networks have been dismantled, the flow of drugs continues unabated. We must adjust our strategy to address the challenges posed by narco-trafficking. In summary, national and regional leaders need to carefully examine the facts related to illicit trafficking and address the situation logically. This must include mobilizing the public for a whole of society approach to these problems.

II. U.S. Perspectives on Countering Transregional-Transnational Threat Networks

There has been significant progress made in the struggle against the threat networks, but there is still a long way to go. Determining how to counteract these networks is more than an academic activity; good strategic thinking is needed to reach a solution. The following real world scenario demonstrated how agencies, countries, and regions must work together to address transnational/transregional networks. In this actual case, six special interest aliens (SIAs) arrived in Sao Paulo on a commercial aircraft. They moved through Brazil to Colombia, and continued on to the Darien jungle in Panama. Stopped at a checkpoint, their biometric data was recorded and entered into a database that, in turn, shared the information with other databases that track criminals and terrorists. The SIAs had connections to terrorist groups in the Mideast, and four of them were apprehended by Guatemalan and U.S. law enforcement agencies as they moved northward through Central America.

This scenario was made possible by sharing information quickly and developing actionable intelligence through linkages to regional databases. We are usually not quick enough; we must get better, with a regional approach, and must do this consistently every day, not only by exception. The only way we will be able to degrade illicit networks is to share intelligence in real time, and to do that we must reduce corruption to a low enough level so that we can continue degrading the network. How to effectively reduce corruption remains an open question.
Security and economics are closely linked, because prosperity requires a certain level of security. Threats to our security cross all boundaries via illicit networks: space, air, land, sea, below the sea, and cyberspace. Sharing information on where and how these threat networks operate is essential to countering them. This requisite information and intelligence can be shared electronically, in person, at meetings, and in other ways.

Economic growth in South America has not been consistent in recent years, with the exception of Peru. Natural disasters, including earthquakes and hurricanes, impact growth rates, and also test our capacity to respond. The armed forces are frequently called upon to assist with disaster response, although they must work with other agencies to provide effective relief and assistance. In recent years, many of the military resources that might otherwise be available for disaster response have been monopolized by other regions that are in the midst of long-running conflicts. Meanwhile, the U.S. is suffering from ever-increasing casualties as a result of the higher quantity of narcotics flowing into the country. In 2016 alone there were more than 59,000 drug-related casualties, more than most wars in recent history.

**Q&A Session:** In the past, collaboration between the U.S. and Latin America was based on security threats to the state. Now, threats to liberty, privacy and personal security may be of greater concern than security threats to the state. Meanwhile, as drug laws evolve, protecting our security agencies against future changes to those laws becomes an issue. While the commodities may change, illicit networks will remain a threat and continue to undermine legitimate governments. Strong institutions free from corruption, therefore, are necessary to ensure the rule of law. Fidel Castro tried to impose his ideology in Chile, and eventually succeeded in Venezuela, establishing a dictatorship. Latin American civil society must play a role in ensuring the future of liberty and democracy in the region.

U.S. security cooperation with Argentina is undergoing a renewal, with a number of military and defense ministry exchanges in recent months. The pace of this interaction is critical to ensure that it does not exceed Argentina’s absorption capability. President Macri initiated significant changes to the diplomatic landscape, and will soon be hosting a G-20 summit, which will require tight security procedures. Since neighboring Brazil recently hosted large international sporting events, they should be a good source for security-related recommendations.

Recently the U.S. has expressed concern about the dramatic increase in coca production in Colombia, even mentioning the possibility of decertifying Colombia as an ally in the battle against narcotics trafficking. U.S. support to Colombia was initially targeted at
Reducing cocaine trafficking, and was later expanded to include the FARC, as a transnational illicit trafficking organization. Aerial fumigation was a key element of this campaign to reduce the flow of coca products, and since it was eliminated by the Santos government, the amount of cocaine produced has reached historic high levels, three times what it was in 2011. Deaths in the U.S. due to opioids have increased significantly, and the U.S. Congress believes the increased cocaine supply from Colombia is at least partially responsible.

Corruption scandals are increasingly the cause of government changes in Latin America, in multiple countries, and the U.S. must develop confidence with the new administrations that have come to power. Realistically, there will always be some level of corruption in government, so it’s important that, once it’s brought to light, the government takes corrective action. This may be difficult and embarrassing, but mechanisms to root out corruption and take remedial action are critical to preserving respect for the institutions of government. One method is by means of an impartial international organization in support of the local justice system, such as CICIG (the International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala) and other similar programs in the region. In the age of instant communications, the risk of false accusations is always present, and ongoing false claims can serve as a significant distraction.

The use of military forces in domestic security roles is a source of constant friction. In Brazil, for example, the Army conducts frequent deployments in Rio de Janeiro to support the police, who are frequently out-gunned by the gangs and are unable to handle the level of violence. Unfortunately, the Brazilian Army is ill-prepared for an urban police support mission, and participants asked if the U.S. could exchange lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. There is a major difference, however, between conducting counter-insurgency operations in a foreign country and operating internally in an urban environment. The latter situation requires a clear mission with support from all agencies of the government, not just the military; a simultaneous, long-term whole-of-government approach to address the underlying issues, which may be socio-economic, educational, etc.

Throughout the region, governments face the eternal struggle between liberty and security, and how to make those values compatible under governmental authority. What are the dividing lines between police investigations and military intelligence and how can interagency cooperation confront these dilemmas? Different countries have arrived at different solutions: Colombia’s national police force is part of the Defense Ministry; Mexico has different police forces for different purposes, etc.

### III. Country Perspectives on Terrorism and Counterterrorism: Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay and the U.S.

Current challenges to global security run the gamut from terrorist groups such as ISIS, Al Qaeda, and Boko Haram to narco-trafficking, from Russia in the Ukraine to Afghanistan, from nuclear threats from Iran to North Korea, and from corruption to cyber-security worldwide. The United States is increasingly concerned about the convergence between illicit networks of organized crime and terrorism. These illicit networks may share the same facilitators, including corruption, logistics, financing, and technology, even though the former is motivated by greed and the latter by ideology or religion.

Examples in this convergence in Latin America include the FARC in Colombia and Sendero Luminoso in Peru, both of which are terrorist organizations with ideological underpinnings, but have been financed by narcotics trafficking for years. Hezbollah facilitators operate in Ciudad del Este and the tri-border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay, generating funds through smuggling, money laundering and other illicit activities to support terrorists in Lebanon and Syria. There is evidence that Venezuela’s government collaborates with narco-traffickers and terrorists for its own benefit, to help it stay in power.

Individuals from around the world have traveled to Iraq and Syria to join ISIS in attempting to establish its own territory (“Caliphate”). Trained in terrorist techniques, these fighters eventually return to their home countries and frequently apply their military-style training and ideological formation to plot home-grown terrorist activities, either independently or inspired by, or in coordination with, external groups. In Latin America and the Caribbean, tracking and monitoring these so-called Special Interest Aliens (SIAs) is a difficult task.
for which many countries are ill-prepared. The United States encourages transnational and transregional collaboration as these SIAs easily move across national borders, and provides training and equipment for that purpose to willing partner nations.

Q&A Session: By focusing on the military manifestations of terrorism, aren’t we attacking the results rather than the causes of terrorism, including the social, religious and economic aspects? Security and development go hand in hand; we must employ a whole-of-government approach that includes a security aspect, but also addresses the underlying causes of discontent.

One of the principal manifestations of convergence in Brazil is the relationship between the First Capital Command (PCC, from its Portuguese initials) and Hezbollah. The PCC has over 23,000 members in all 27 Brazilian states. It was founded in 1993 in the prison system and its principal source of income is from drug trafficking. Hezbollah is most active in the Tri-Border Area (TBA) but maintains a presence among the 12 million Lebanese descendants living in Brazil, including about one million Shiites in the TBA, Sao Paulo, and Curitiba. The convergence between these groups developed in the prison system, controlled by the PCC, in which Hezbollah prisoners receive protection from the PCC, and provide weapons, explosives and drugs in return. Hezbollah ships drugs to Europe and the Middle East, frequently via Africa, and also traffics in other illicit contraband and counterfeit items. Both the PCC and Hezbollah are strengthened by this relationship, resulting in more violence, corruption, financial terrorism and insecure borders for Brazil.

Narcoterrorism is the main form of terrorism in Colombia, most notably represented by the FARC. Former President Alvaro Uribe’s “Democratic Security” program was essentially a military solution to the FARC, but involving the citizenry in the fight. He implemented a war tax to fund the military’s personnel and equipment requirements, recaptured territory ceded by previous administrations to the FARC, and extradited senior FARC and narco-trafficker leaders to the U.S. for prosecution. These actions created the conditions for President Santos’ peace agreement with the FARC, although it was initially rejected by a popular referendum. Later approved by Congress with minor changes, the peace accord is undergoing implementation and the partially-disarmed FARC is transitioning to a political party. All of this was possible due to expansive international cooperation and focused political will. Unfortunately for the U.S., Santos’ policies (including the end of aerial fumigation of coca crops) has led to extreme growth of the coca crop, with three times the amount of cocaine being exported to the U.S. compared to three years ago.

The Paraguay Popular Army (EPP) is the principal source of terrorism in Paraguay, supported by Cuba and Venezuela. The EPP’s primary illicit activity is kidnap for ransom. Some fugitive EPP members escaped to Bolivia and Argentina; the latter has returned captured members to Paraguay. There is a connection between the EPP and the PCC in Brazil, and international cooperation in the Tri-Border Area is essential to countering the EPP. Paraguay receives security cooperation assistance from the U.S. and Colombia, and has implemented new laws strengthening the legal code, and has allowed extradition to the U.S. Paraguay created an interagency task force to establish greater Paraguayan government presence in formerly ungoverned spaces.

Q&A Session: What other examples of convergence exist between the various illicit groups in Brazil?

The PCC has a presence in all Brazilian states, especially in the prison system. The FARC tried to take over trafficking routes in states where the PCC was weaker, but was unsuccessful. Mexico’s “Familia del Norte” is also a player in Brazil. Drugs continue to flow at the same rate after the FARC signed the peace accord, as other groups have taken over areas and routes abandoned by the FARC.

In Brazilian jails, the forced recruiting of children continues unabated, and is an easy task since common criminals are mixed together with terrorists.

Could both the PCC and EPP be responsible for crimes, including kidnappings, in Argentina? Yes, these groups are possible sources for criminal activity in Argentina.
DAY TWO

Countercrime

I. Peruvian Counter-Crime Strategy in the Valley of the Rivers Apurimac, Ene, and Mantaro (VRAEM)

The Peruvian VRAEM is an extensive zone covering four departments (states), over 60,000 square kilometers, with more than 650,000 inhabitants. It is characterized by extensive poverty and unemployment among a very young population. In 2012, the area was designated a national priority for socioeconomic development and pacification, with an interagency/whole of government commission created for that purpose (CODEVRAEM). This multi-sectoral agency developed an integral strategy for the VRAEM with four objectives: addressing poverty, inequality, drugs, and terrorism.

Responsibility for internal order in the VRAEM was legally delegated to the armed forces, supported by the Peruvian National Police (PNP). They face a wide array of threats, including illicit trafficking of narcotics, remnants of terrorist groups, corruption, arms trafficking, money laundering and illegal gold mining with severe environmental impacts. As elsewhere, there is a convergence between the drug traffickers and terrorist groups, creating a mutual dependence based on trading drug profits for protection and arms. The consequences of this unholy alliance include insecurity and lack of governability and investment, which reduce the effectiveness of anti-poverty programs.

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The strategic objectives of the Peruvian government in the VRAEM are to neutralize and deny financing to the remnants of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path, a Maoist insurgency), recover hostages, create a strategic energy system, and support integral action by the state to reduce poverty. Resources allocated for those purposes include a joint task force of the armed forces, augmented by a special operations and intelligence task force with PNP and Justice Ministry participation, comprised of four brigades with mobile command posts.

This joint task force has successfully neutralized the illicit air bridge from the VRAEM to Bolivia, using helicopter gunships to intercept the traffickers’ light planes (‘narcovionetas extranjeras”), and destroying illicit air strips on the ground. In response, the traffickers are constructing air strips outside the VRAEM in remote jungles to the north, with hundreds identified to date. Aircraft flying from these air strips to Mexico or the U.S. must refuel several times, requiring the traffickers to corrupt numerous officials along the way in exchange for unimpeded passage. Another target of the task force are the chemicals required to covert coca leaves to cocaine.

II. U.S. Countering Transnational Organized Crime (CTOC) Strategy in the Americas

Governments have leading roles in protecting society from transnational organized crime, including providing security, promoting prosperity, and ensuring good governance. They are faced with a wide variety of illicit activities, from narco-trafficking, to human trafficking, financial crimes, corruption, contraband, etc. Where there is demand for illicit products or services, someone will supply them if there is a profit to be made. Those crimes come with a price tag for society—costing an estimated 3.5% of GDP for Latin America.

Latin America faces a set of severe challenges to prosperity and security. Ensuring citizen security is perhaps the most difficult task, caused in part by high levels of inequality. Illicit networks, which send drugs and people north, and bring guns and money south, directly impact citizen security, as controlling routes is critical for illicit traffickers and brings with it debilitating violence. Many of the most violent cities in the world are in Central America, including San Salvador (El Salvador) and San Pedro Sula (Honduras). These countries depend heavily on remittances from family members in the U.S. to bolster their economies, but those same remittances are frequently a method of laundering money. Corruption permeates all levels of the state and society, threatening governments’ stability, as witnessed by the impact of the Odebrecht scandal, which has affected several countries in Central America, the Caribbean and most of South America.

The U.S. CTOC strategy includes 56 “priorities,” which are grouped into the areas of governance, economics, and the terror-crime nexus. To address these threats, the U.S. has to start at home by improving intelligence and information sharing, better protecting the financial system, interrupting drug trafficking, and also look abroad to generate international capability and cooperation. Interagency and international programs funded by the U.S. for the Americas include Plan Colombia, the Merida Initiative (Mexico), the Central
American Regional Security Initiative (Carsi), the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative (CBSI), and Joint Interagency Task Force-South (Jiatf-S), to name just a few. Executive Order (13773) against CTOC and Illicit Trafficking was issued in February 2017 to strengthen the application of existing U.S. laws and improve cooperation with partner nations in the region.

President Trump has issued several executive orders that address aspects of illicit trafficking, enhancing border security and enforcing immigration laws, better protecting against entrance by foreign terrorists, and countering transnational organized crime and illicit trafficking. Nevertheless, the increased supply of opioids has lowered the price for these narcotics, resulting in a rising number of addicts. Opium-related deaths in the U.S. average more than one hundred per day, a national crisis that is being addressed by the Presidential Commission against Opioid Addiction.

The Departments of Homeland Security and State recently co-hosted, with Mexico, a Prosperity and Security Conference for Central America, in Miami. This event promoted the adoption of a “whole of nation” approach to counter threats including corruption and impunity. It focused on investment and development as a means to improve living conditions and enable greater citizen security, under the rule of law.

Q&A Session: What are the proper roles for the police and armed forces in countering transnational organized criminal groups?

A controversial element in this CTOC effort is how to balance the roles and participation of the police and the armed forces. The role of the armed forces includes legal limitations on the use of force, depending on the type of organization the armed forces are engaging: armed groups or delinquent groups. Colombia, for example, has had both armed insurgents (FARC, ELN) and narcotics traffickers protecting their illicit trafficking goods and routes. Each country has its own legal considerations and national priorities that affect how they cooperate internationally to counter transnational criminal organizations.

How can these sometimes conflicting considerations and requirements be reconciled? It is imperative that we demonstrate the need for cooperation to benefit everyone living in the region. One criminal or special interest alien can affect multiple countries, as we have seen, by taking advantage of weak border security and the seams they offer illicit traffickers. Politicians must be educated on the risks they face if they do not learn how to cooperate more effectively. Providing examples of the consequences of failure to cooperate is one method of emphasizing the need for international cooperation.

III. Country Perspectives on the Role of the Military and Police in Citizen Security: Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico

Brazil has four police forces established by the federal constitution: military police, civilian police, federal
police and highway police. The first two of these are part of the public order system of the states. In addition, the armed forces have the legal right to engage in enforcement of domestic order if requested by a state governor. The military works in conjunction with the federal police to control the borders, supports major international events (i.e., Olympics), and guarantees law and order (such as when the police go on strike or are unable to control a situation). They also may be called to assist during prison uprisings and actions to control the favelas (slums).

Countering transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) in Brazil calls for greater cooperation between the military and police forces. The police alone lack sufficient personnel and equipment to address the TCOs without assistance, and do not coordinate effectively across state borders, nor with the military when they conduct joint missions. They have proven ineffective in halting the wave of violence sweeping across Brazil. Other problems with the police include their inability to sustain adequate forces in a troubled area for sufficient time, lack of adequate coordination with intelligence agencies, and an inefficient system to stop social violence due to an inadequate understanding of the problem.

Solutions to these problems are evident, albeit difficult to implement. A more intense effort is underway to better integrate the military, police, and intelligence agencies in order to provide better citizen security. There is a recognition that a new system of public order may be needed to address the challenges posed by TCOs. Finally, Brazil must better integrate the public order and penitentiary systems so they function effectively.

Chile has experienced notable success with its economy, but crime and violence continue to be a major concern for its citizens. Citizen security, which includes freedom from fear and necessity, and the ability to live with dignity, is Chile's overall domestic security objective. Prevention of violence is a primary goal, along with combating delinquency, and these goals should not rely mostly on the police and repression.

National defense, in contrast, is designed to preserve the country’s independence and sovereignty over its national territory. There is some overlap between security and defense, but only in limited circumstances, when military capabilities are required. Factors involved in military capability include such things as materiel, training, organization, doctrine, logistics/sustainment, and infrastructure. They can be employed in case of natural disasters, for international peacekeeping missions, and to control illicit trafficking in maritime territory and national air space.

**Q&A Session:** What is the situation with the Mapuche tribal unrest?

This is a complicated situation and a combination of issues. There is disagreement over who, exactly, is a Mapuche, and what their rights are versus the state’s. They claim sacred lands, but some of them are insurgents and criminals, engaged in corrupt practices. When police are taken hostage by the Mapuche, the armed forces will come to their rescue.

Citizen security is best achieved through sustainable human development, by strengthening human capital through citizenship, and by increasing citizens’ participation in community activities that serve to prevent violence. Inclusive public policy decisions, based more closely on social reality, will facilitate better governance.

Citizen security in Colombia requires greater police integrity, more public policy focus, and better training. These must coincide with a gradual evolution of the joint military-police organizations and activities to more effectively address Colombia’s security challenges. Establishing the Joint Special Operations Command (CCOES) is a step in that direction. These capabilities should be better integrated in the battle against the Gulf Clan and the ELN (National Liberation Army). Meanwhile, the 26 FARC demobilization zones (ETCR—Territorial Spaces for Training and Reincorporation) must be carefully monitored to prevent them from being converted into criminal operation zones.

Colombia faces a number of challenges and priorities as it addresses citizen security issues. Organized crime’s expansion into narco-trafficking must be controlled. The number of prisoners held in overcrowded Colombian jails must be reduced. Interagency destabilization due to corruption must be avoided. Finally, the government must attempt to meet or temper expectations by social organizations for cooperative agreements.

Mexico’s record in citizen security is much worse than official pronouncements indicate. Massive police
Corruption continues, allowing about 90% of the drugs entering the U.S. to cross the border from Mexico, including through ports and other maritime borders, and commercial or non-commercial flights. Mexico claims it has no major problem with drug consumption, but that is changing as traffickers provide compensation to their foot soldiers in product, which is then sold for local consumption.

Economic inequality remains high in Mexico, in part because 60% of the economy lies in the informal sector, and many areas are outside of government control. Private security forces are ubiquitous, an indication of the overall security situation and the inability of the police to control crime and violence. The armed forces were mobilized to address the insecurity created by drug trafficking organizations, and they came out against the local police forces and politicians, offering the military in substitution. The armed forces, however, have neither the legal standing nor the training to address drug trafficking, so their use in this effort has been counterproductive, with arguably catastrophic results. Employing the armed forces in this way has proven to be the wrong solution to the problem.

**IV. Transnational Organized Crime and Illicit Trafficking in the Americas: Argentina, Brazil, Venezuela, USSOUTHCOM (NET)**

Argentina has exercised minimal control over its land borders, as immigration has long been encouraged, and immigrants are concentrated in the Buenos Aires area. Recent years, however, have witnessed an increase in demand for human trafficking, primarily for sexual purposes, provided by well-funded traffickers. This human trafficking is hard to control due to the difficulty in finding adequate proof for prosecuting cases, because of the cross-border, international nature of the crime, requiring evidence obtained from other countries. Corrupt officials compound these prosecutorial challenges.

Law enforcement agencies and institutions are responsible for managing investigations and protecting the victims of human trafficking. Argentina has adopted a series of policies and strategies to address this problem, beginning with better immigration and border controls. Legislation has been passed to provide legal protections and authorities. Social services are provided to victims, including medical and psychological care, witness protection, and financial and other services. Personnel involved in these programs are receiving better training, and are reporting data to international organizations including UNASUR and the OAS. Overall, Argentina is dedicating more resources to counter human trafficking and its effects, aware that it has broad-ranging impacts on the country’s human rights record and international relations, as well as other organized criminal activity and organizations.

Brazil is experiencing a tremendous security crisis due to the impact of transnational organized crime, in which its own politicians are the major protagonists, much more so than any terrorist group. This situation took root in Brazil’s prisons, which house the fourth
largest number of prisoners in the world. The Red Command formed in the favelas during the 1970s, and then-President Brizola made the mistake of prohibiting the police from even entering the favelas. Later, in 1993, prisoners formed the First Capital Command (PCC), which became a major violent illicit trafficking organization that controls most of the prisons in Brazil. There is an ongoing war among various criminal factions for control of the border area with Paraguay. These circumstances are facilitated by endemic corruption, shortcomings in the training, structure and organization of the police forces, and poor coordination between military and police forces.

To overcome these serious security challenges, Brazil must better coordinate and integrate the activities of the police, military, and intelligence agencies. A new national public order system should be created to address organized criminal groups, and this system must integrate the prisons in its overall strategy since they are a source of major criminal gangs.

While other countries in the region are fighting transnational organized crime, Venezuela has become a state led by criminals. It serves as the perfect model for criminal convergence, with organized criminal groups and their facilitators operating under a criminal totalitarian regime. The capital, Caracas, is the most violent city in the world. One of seven of the world’s 50 most violent cities are in Venezuela. By independent estimates, Venezuela ranks among the least competitive (#132 out of 140), most corrupt (#166/170), with less justice (#113/113) of all the countries in the world.

Internationally, Venezuela participates in criminal and other prejudicial activities that negatively impact its neighbors. It provides passports to special interest aliens and potential terrorists from Syria, Iran, Pakistan and Iraq. Venezuela’s armed forces are accused of trading weapons for cocaine, and have allowed FARC guerrillas to establish camps inside Venezuela. Government officials have been linked to corruption cases in Argentina, Brazil, and Panama, and several of them have been sanctioned by the U.S. government for human rights violations, corruption, and narcotics trafficking, including the current vice president.

Only radical change can overcome Venezuela’s status as a criminal state. First, democracy must be restored and the government’s ideological orientation eliminated. Autonomous, transparent institutions should be reestablished under the rule of law. Corruption and illicit networks must be directly confronted. Finally, a balance must be achieved between state and citizen security.

The United States and its Southern Command take a networked approach to the challenges posed by transnational organized crime and illicit trafficking. Although drugs continue to dominate, trafficking occurs in many commodities. Special interest aliens share the same illicit networks as drug traffickers and they also share information. Traffickers tend to be hurt more by cash seizures than anything else, so “following the money” is a productive strategy. Corruption, of course, permeates all aspects of transnational threat networks and must be a consideration in all strategies to counter these networks.

Recently, synthetic opioids such as fentanyl have been introduced by traffickers, sometimes mixed with other narcotics. Ironically, deaths due to fentanyl are killing off many of their customers. Meanwhile, one of the programs to reduce coca production, crop substitution, has only been marginally successful because the required infrastructure—roads to export substitute products—is not in place nor easy to create.

U.S. Southern Command has created a new organization to identify and illuminate threat networks so they can be actioned by partner nation law enforcement or military agencies, the Network Engagement Team (NET). The NET’s objective is to develop actionable intelligence, not just general information, which those partner nation law enforcement or military agencies can use to erode the illicit networks and keep them off balance.

DAY THREE

Cybersecurity/Emerging Technologies/Strategies

I. Cybersecurity and Emerging Technologies—U.S.

The three greatest forces on the planet today are technology, globalization, and climate change. Technology is changing at accelerating rates that are difficult to comprehend, much less manage and govern, creating a mismatch that is at the center of societal turmoil. The internet of things (IoT) now includes billions of microprocessors interconnected worldwide through the Web. Digital connection speeds have increased geometrically as the technology progressed from 2G to 3G to 4G and soon, to 5G, which may
learn about and enable anticipation of users’ needs. Amidst all of this data and internet connectivity, the issue of cybersecurity becomes paramount and a top priority in the U.S. and Latin America. Principal areas of risk in the cyber world include the availability of the internet (accessible based on demand), maintaining confidentiality (data is only visible to authorized persons), and preserving the integrity of data systems (no unauthorized access). Cyber risks in Latin America can be functionally categorized under: (1) users, who require connectivity and become dependent; (2) providers, who are at the mercy of the structure and organization of access to the web; and (3) content, which circulates and is shared quickly, even by/with users on the margins of the law.

Strategic political analysis of cyber security is a critical step in developing policies and strategies that integrate appropriate mechanisms to safeguard the integrity of national cyberspace throughout Latin America. This analysis should include considerations of the legal structure and authorities, the technological infrastructure, organizational structures, technological capacity building, and the incorporation of public-private cooperation, both domestically and internationally. The results of this analysis should lead to the development of national cyber-security confidence and security-building measures, which pose great challenges in Latin America. These challenges call for national cyber-security strategies, requiring a senior-level coordinating agency with the authority to assign responsibilities, and with public-private connectivity. Monitoring and enforcement organizations should be an integral part of this construct.

Unlike in the nuclear arena, in the cyber world there are no international agreements that limit cyberattacks. Such attacks may target a wide variety of devices and equipment, including cars, which can be hacked and hijacked, to medical devices, to household items such as thermostats and light fixtures. So far, convenience has trumped security in the spread of these internet-connected devices, and a balance must be found to prevent their misuse. International cooperation is critical to increasing security in the internet of things; leaders must invest in education, and develop an understanding of Big Data and infrastructure vulnerabilities. [**there is no brief explanation of what Big Data is and what one refers to as “infrastructure vulnerabilities”.]

Q&A Session: Extending the global commons to include cyberspace, who has the power to regulate that space?

While Google, Amazon, and Apple have the most power over cyberspace, no one has the power to fully regulate it. Individual countries have much less power, although both Russia and China want to control cyberspace. The U.S. and the European Union believe it should be open and not controlled by any single country or entity.

Estonia was paralyzed by a cyberattack, allegedly from Russia, in 2007. Was there evidence to support those allegations? Who has the responsibility to defend critical infrastructure, the state or corporations (in the case of the 2013 Target data breach, for example)? There are no traditional military options as the cyber attackers do not physically move or advance; they remain in place. U.S. Cyber Command, for example, does not have responsibility for all U.S. cyberspace. Companies that create a presence in cyberspace must learn how to protect it. Estonia learned a lot from that attack and shared its lessons learned, including protecting critical infrastructure such as hospitals, which were in chaos and unable to conduct surgery.

Cyber defense requires rapid adaptation to daily changes in the threats; how can you convince leaders to confront these dynamic threats?

Military leaders are trained to understand problem sets and develop courses of action. They must be convinced to take the lead in their own cyber defense. Developing an understanding of the consequences and risks of not preparing a proper defense can contribute to this effort.

Some South American countries suffer many attacks, especially from malware originating in Africa and Asia. What is the best method to develop a cyber defense strategy that is practical for policymakers?

Chapter 7 of the UN Charter addresses threats to peace that are elevated to international levels. When will a cyberattack be considered a threat to peace under Chapter 7? When would the U.S. use physical force to counter a cyberattack?

It is not possible to apply a chapter from the UN Charter, dating to the mid-1900s, to the 21st century. The UN pays little attention to cyber issues, dealing mostly with physical borders. The cyber border between two countries is impossible to define. North
Korea, for example, attacked Sony but the U.S. took no action because there was no concrete evidence of the source. Instead, Sony requested assistance from other companies.

What is the current state of cybersecurity? Are there concrete examples of cyberattacks in Latin America? Can cyber be a legitimate force?

The U.S. cannot provide proof of how it determines the source of attacks, as that would reveal sensitive sources and methods to the attackers. Therefore, it is almost impossible to convincingly demonstrate to the international community the country behind cyberattacks. Each country must use its own cyber methods to defend against and counter cyberattacks.

The Perry Center’s cybersecurity course directly addressed these and other issues, requiring breakout groups to prepare a project for each country analyzing the causes and proposing solutions. The final product is presented in seven formatted slides thus emphasizing the need for an executive and thorough approach. The conclusion of this exercise indicates, in general terms, that an effective national strategy must be simple and basic, without the use of cyber jargon, and must be crafted within each country’s legal framework.

II. Promoting Inclusive Security in the Americas: Argentina, Chile and Peru

This all-female panel focused on the issue referred to in the U.S. as “Women, Peace, and Security (WPS),” and addressed the varying approaches to gender inclusiveness in South American and U.S. security forces. The U.S. emphasizes National Action Plans to implement WPS that include elements of protection, prevention, and participation.

Argentina’s policies regarding gender inclusiveness are based on various international conventions, including the OAS’ Interamerican Convention to prevent, sanction, and eliminate violence against women, and UN Resolution 1325, among others. They provide opportunities to enhance the common defense, ensure civilian control, and provide accountability for the security forces. Challenges that must be overcome to realize these opportunities include the lack of interagency coordination, an inadequate budget, and erroneous data. To that end, Argentina has created action plans and programs to address gender issues and fully integrate women into the armed forces. Participation in UN peacekeeping operations is one example of successful inclusion of significant numbers of women in overseas missions (Haiti and Cyprus).

Argentina’s armed forces have included women officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted, for at least the past 15-20 years, and they now comprise 17% of total military personnel. These uniformed females face a number of career challenges while serving in the armed forces, including overcoming the infamous “glass ceiling” that limits how high they can ascend in the military hierarchy. The organization tends to promote similar members to senior positions, and those promotion boards are mostly populated by men. Promotion boards and the policies that guide them must include women and reflect gender inclusiveness to overcome these limitations. This should be part of a broader effort in the armed forces to promote equal participation by women and eliminate gender-based violence.

Chile created its first National Action Plan on women in peace and security in 2009 in compliance with UN Security Council Resolution 1325, guaranteeing the protection of women and children in conflict situations. One of Chile’s principal foreign policy goals is to strengthen regional and global cooperation to guarantee equal rights for women and encourage the cultural changes needed to attain more inclusive societies.

Currently Chile is implementing its second National Action Plan (NAP, 2015). This plan focuses on the basic elements of prevention, participation, protection, and support and recovery. Prevention is achieved by incorporating a gender perspective in all of the activities and strategies that are part of conflict prevention, to include preventing all forms of sexual violence. Promoting and supporting the active participation of women in all of the peace processes and strengthening alliances with international organizations that defend the rights of women is the second element of the NAP. The third element, protection, refers to strengthening and improving measure to guarantee all aspects of the security of women and children in peacekeeping operations, and in conflict and post-conflict situations. The fourth element, support and recovery, aims to guarantee equal access to conflict-related assistance and services, including transitional justice.

In the Chilean armed forces, women participate in several of the peacekeeping missions and comprise
14% of total military personnel. The major obstacles to greater participation by women in peacekeeping operations are the lack of speaking foreign languages; personal preference to remain in Chile; other professional commitments and; lack of sufficient promotion opportunities. Chile is making every effort to provide more opportunities for female participation in peacekeeping missions, understanding that full peace is not possible without the participation of women in all aspects of our societies.

Peru can claim a long history of actions and laws promoting gender inclusiveness, even though the country does not yet have a National Action Plan. A series of laws guarantees various rights and protections to females in the armed forces and police, where they have served as professional members since 1997. While 40% of the police force is female, only 7% of the Army are women, and the highest rank a female in the Army has attained is lieutenant colonel. Female personnel have participated in most UN peacekeeping missions supported by Peru.

Several opportunities are available now and in the near future for Peru to expand its gender-inclusive activities. Peru is already a signatory to several international agreements on the issue. There is significant existing national legislation on gender and equality of opportunity. In 2018 Peru will serve on the UN Security Council where it will assume responsibility for implementing Resolution 1325, serving as co-president (with Sweden) of the informal working group on Women, Peace and Security. Peru may increase the number of women serving in UN peacekeeping missions supported by Peru.

ARGENTINA: Argentina employs several different police forces that operate in various geographical areas or have specific functions. The Federal Police operate nationwide as a national police force. The relatively-new Federal Capital Police serve as a dedicated police force for the city of Buenos Aires, serving under the mayor. The new recruits comprising this force have created many problems. The Gendarmes (Gendarmería) are a combination of highway and border patrol police. There are also port police (Portuaria) and a coast guard-type force with police powers (Prefectura Naval).

A major challenge for Argentina is improving the current limited coordination among these forces and developing unity of effort in the common fight against an organized, transnational crime. So far this effort has been problematic. The change of administrations did not bring with it continuity in the police intelligence arena. On the contrary, the outgoing administration left no intelligence archives from which to support the development of actionable intelligence on current internal security threats.

In summary, Argentina must create an internal intelligence coordination mechanism so that its various law enforcement agencies can collate and share information at the national level. To take action on this shared information, interagency coordination and operations will be required. Transnational threats are exacerbated by borders that are routinely bypassed and loosely controlled, a complicating factor for law enforcement.

BRAZIL: Brazil’s long borders and history of well-organized, violent criminal trafficking organizations, including the Red Command and the First Capital Command, complicate its ability to counter transnational threats. Implementation of a new command and control system, for the prevention and fight against transnational crime during recent major sporting events, was a positive step in that direction, although additional measures are required. One of these measures is the adoption of common technical and operational procedures among the state police and border guards. Brazil also needs a joint intelligence mechanism for the police, armed forces, and justice system in the national command and control center. Community policing, supported by intelligence, must be strengthened. Greater investment in training and education for the military and border police, as well

III. Promoting Strategies to Counter Transnational Threats: Argentina, Brazil and Chile

It will be a challenge for Peru to more effectively socialize Resolution 1325 to state and private organizations, and to civil society in general. Another test will be for Peru to empower more women through participation in conflict resolution and both peace-keeping and peace-making. Women must also participate to a greater extent in all aspects of decision-making. There must be more training events on women’s perspectives in defense and security, as well as greater female participation in related training and educational institutions.
as better practical educational activities for young people at risk (drug use prevention), are critical requirements. At the political level, Brazil needs a stronger, integrated public security cabinet to address these issues nationwide.

Brazil has strong institutions below the Supreme Court level, including police forces. A majority of the population supports the judicial investigations into corruption, which benefits a select few but not the population as a whole.

Chile: Chile’s approach to transnational, transregional threats emphasizes prevention, communications, and care for the victims, focusing on the human consequences of illicit trafficking. One suggestion is to create a “Department of Preventive Communication” that conducts both domestic and external communications designed to sensitize the population and help prevent such crimes as trafficking in persons. Phase One of that program should be oriented toward national government and non-government organizations with roles that include victim assistance, rehabilitation, reparations, and training for caregivers. Phase Two may involve external training, coordination, and publicity for personnel who may have direct contact with victims, such as employees of airports, medical clinics, public transportation, shops, etc.

This proposal would seek to create a community of prevention, provide opportunities for victims to become whole again, involve the greater society, and provide innovative, practical solutions to the problem of illicit trafficking in persons.

IV. Promoting Strategies to Counter Transnational Threats: Colombia, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay

Colombia: Although officially at peace after decades of internal conflict, Colombia is now confronting a confluence of events that create a challenging security environment. The expected “peace dividend,” combined with a decline in the price of oil, contributed to budgetary reductions in the police and armed forces while at the same time urban insecurity is increasing, the result of activity by multiple criminal groups and illicit traffickers. In the countryside, illegal criminal groups are operating in, and occupying, former FARC territory. All of this is occurring in the context of increased corruption and the collapse of the justice system.

Theoretically, Colombia is well-positioned to address these security challenges, boasting the largest military force per 100,000 population (781.6/100K) in Latin America and the fourth largest per square kilometer (32.4/km2). The cost of maintaining this force, however, may be unsustainable at 11.8% of the national budget and 3.4% of GDP in 2017, much higher than any other country in the region.

A number of institutional courses of action have been suggested and are under consideration as strategies to counter these criminal networks. Conducting joint police-military operations in rural areas could overcome logistical and firepower limitations of the police operating alone. Currently, the police are part of the Defense Ministry and may not always receive enough support and resources to meet their mission requirements. Establishing a new Public Security Ministry to oversee the police and provide ministerial-level emphasis within the federal government should be considered. Meanwhile, the police and armed forces need to build bridges to the local communities, in order to develop greater trust and confidence with the public. This may require a complete overhaul in the security and defense establishment. Certainly a greater state presence in remote and vulnerable areas should be established to improve citizen security, combined with better intelligence targeted at these new challenges. To reduce the debilitating effects of corruption, an effective anti-corruption force and policy should be developed. Increased efforts to control borders is necessary to limit transnational illicit trafficking. In summary, a complete overhaul of Colombia’s urban security strategies may be desirable.

Paraguay: Paraguay’s Public Ministry has overall responsibility for the legal aspects of citizen security and for ensuring compliance with international agreements governing illicit trafficking. The Justice Ministry is responsible for prisoner transfers under certain treaties. Foreign Ministry is the primary authority when there are no bilateral or multilateral agreements, and with Mercosur, Bolivia and Chile.

Several working groups exist within the Public Ministry to address specific crimes, including a system of financial intelligence for money laundering (SEPRED), with technical assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Paraguay National Bank, and police working groups to address trafficking in persons and narcotics trafficking. The Office of
Strategic Information Analysis (DAIE) was created to assist Public Ministry personnel throughout the country to obtain access to information and databases from public and private organizations for use in criminal investigations. They also created an internal database for use by the investigators. DAIE provides analysis of investigative strategies for complex cases and supports other agencies, as required.

PERU: Peru views the strategy of conflicts and security as an evolution, from collective security and defense, to a hybrid of collective defense and cooperative security. The number of risks and threats to security is lengthy and includes poverty, corruption, illegal migration, trafficking in persons, pandemics, contraband, illegal mining, environmental issues, cyber, and the traditional state-on-state threats. Appropriate responses to these threats run the gamut from military, to mixed, to non-military solutions. Thus it is imperative to employ an effective planning process to identify capabilities and assign the right resources to the various threats.

Peru’s strategic concept of operations is to develop needed capacities and ensure an adequate information flow to decision-makers, who must include increased interagency coordination in their decision-making process. This process was followed in the case of illegal mining with good results, and there are similar examples in the areas of illegal fishing and cybersecurity. In all cases, successful actions required interagency cooperation nationally and internationally, to assemble a network operating on the basis of coordinated unity of effort.

URUGUAY: Uruguay is the third safest country in South America for cybersecurity after Chile and Peru. It has viewed personal security as a fundamental right, tracing its history from the French Revolution to the Uruguayan constitution of 1997. Until recently, security has mostly been the purview of the police forces, but since the 1990s, and especially since 2001, defense and security have required coordinated action by military and police forces to successfully counter the multidimensional, complex threats represented by transnational organized crime. These transnational criminal organizations have engendered a form of criminal insurgency carried out by violent gangs.

A major issue is whether or not the armed forces should be providing greater support to the police or remain on the margins of countering transnational organized crime. If current security requirements indicate the need for greater military support to law enforcement, then the legal framework must be updated to authorize the
military to conduct special missions during peacetime. This is part of an evolving trend from lack of trust in the military to a collaborative approach, reflecting a balanced strategy of prevention and repression.