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Requirements for Military Effectiveness: Chile in Comparative Perspective

Thomas C. Bruneau



**William J. Perry Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies**
National Defense University



Cover photo caption: Former Chilean President Michelle Bachelet reviews military troops during the Great Military Parade in 2014. Photo credit: Chilean government.

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About the author:

Dr. Thomas C. Bruneau is Distinguished Professor Emeritus of National Security Affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). Dr. Bruneau was Chairman of the Department of National Security Affairs from 1989 until 1995. He became Director of the Center for Civil Military Relations in November 2000 and continued until December 2004. He is the author of six books, editor or co-editor of a dozen books, and the author of dozens of academic articles. He specializes in various security issues including street gangs, civil-military relations, and intelligence reform. He can be reached at tbruneau@nps.edu.

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Introduction

This paper utilizes a framework we have developed to analyze civil-military relations in terms of both democratic civilian control and effectiveness.¹ As the achievement of effectiveness only makes sense in terms of the roles and missions actually implemented by the security forces in a country, the roles and missions will be spelled out. The focus in this paper will be on comparative analysis of four countries that the author finds to be relatively successful in achieving both democratic civilian control and effectiveness. Since few roles and missions can be proven to be successful, the author believes the focus must necessarily be on three essential elements for effectiveness. Consequently, the implementation of a military strategy or policy requires an analysis as to whether or not these essential elements are present.

In view of the difficulty in defining, and even more so in measuring outcomes in military roles and missions, the author's analytical framework focuses on essential elements; that which is necessary, if not sufficient for effectiveness. That is, to posit (based on research and discussions with other researchers as well as civilian officials and military officers) what is necessary for the military to be under democratic civilian control and be effective in the specific roles or missions that it is directed to achieve.²

The author has studied in some depth through interviews in approximately twenty countries on four continents, and another twenty through secondary sources, and finds in Chile, Colombia, Portugal, and since early 2018 in the United States a relatively high degree of harmony between democratic civilian control and military effectiveness. While the four countries are indeed very different in size, resources base, democratic consolidation, threats, etc. the author feels there is something to be learned from their experiences in achieving democratic civilian control and military effectiveness. While there is a rich literature on countries' progress in achieving, or not, democratic civilian control, there is very little on achieving military effectiveness.³

¹ Thomas C. Bruneau and Florina Cristiana Matei, "Towards a New Conceptualization of Democratization and Civil-Military Relations," *Democratization* 15 (5) (2008); Thomas Bruneau and Aurel Croissant, Editors. *Civil-Military Relations: Control and Effectiveness across Regimes*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2019.

² There is a large and sophisticated literature on "military effectiveness" from an International Relations perspective. The dependent variable, however, is success in wars, and while success in inter-state conflict is clearly extremely important, at the most twelve out of some 190 countries in the contemporary world are prepared to fight wars with other countries.

³ For a review of the literature and efforts at conceptualization, see Bruneau and Croissant, 2019.

Effectiveness as Well as Civilian Control - An Approach Based on Essential Elements

Several scholars who research and publish on civil – military relations are attempting to broaden the focus of analysis beyond control in order to make the study of civil-military relations more useful. In this effort, the author includes his work with Cris Matei in various publications, his *Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. National Security*; Aurel Croissant and David Kuehn, eds. *Reforming Civil-Military Relations in New Democracies*; David Pion-Berlin and Rafael Martínez, *Soldiers, Politicians, and Civilians: Reforming Civil-Military Relations in Democratic Latin America*; Harold Trinkunas, *Crafting Civilian Control of the Military in Venezuela: A Comparative Perspective*; Carlos Solar, *Government and Governance of Security*; and, most recently, Thomas Bruneau and Aurel Croissant, eds, *Civil-Military Relations: Control and Effectiveness Across Regimes*.

Control

The component of control in the framework stipulates the necessity of having a functioning institution within the executive branch, most commonly called a ministry of defense. The definition of institutions is derived from the work of Hall and Taylor.⁴ It further stipulates oversight institutions to ensure compliance within both the executive and legislative branches. And, in order to ensure compliance with both of these requirements, it stipulates a reformed educational system for the security forces to inculcate an ethic of respect for civilian control and the achievement of the goals defined by duly elected civilians. The focus, then, leads us to consider the essential requirements for security effectiveness. In his most recent publication, Carlos Solar has utilized this framework in his analysis of Chile.⁵

Effectiveness in security is not limited to, as the phrase goes, “fighting and winning the nation’s war”, but to a very wide range of tasks. In the case of Chile, these roles and missions include territorial defense, participating in peacekeeping operations, fighting organized crime and street gangs, military support to civilian authorities in civil unrest and natural disasters. As success, or effectiveness, cannot be demonstrated in any but possibly the first of these varied roles and missions, the focus of necessity becomes on essential requirements.

Effectiveness

As with control, three essential elements for effectiveness are identified. They are strategy, implementing institutions, and resources. The three must be analyzed together, and conceptualized dynamically as one and all are in constant change. The spirit or inspiration of this is conveyed in the following quote from John Lewis Gaddis, *On Grand Strategy*: “Because ends exist only in the imagination, they can be infinite: a throne on the moon, perhaps with a great view. Means, though, are stubbornly finite: they’re

⁴ Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C.R. Taylor, “Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms,” *Political Studies*, XLIV, 1996, p. 938.

⁵ Carlos Solar, “Chile: Defense Governance and Democratic Consolidation,” in Thomas Bruneau and Aurel Croissant, eds. *Civil-Military Relations: Control and Effectiveness across Regimes*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2019.

boots on the ground, ships in the sea, and the bodies required to fill them. Ends and means have to connect if anything is to happen. They're never, however, interchangeable."⁶ In short, strategy is the vision of matching ends with means. The connection is via implementing institutions, and it takes resources to put boots on the ground and ships in the sea, and the bodies required to fill them.

How all of this relates to civil-military relations is described brilliantly in the following passage from military historian and strategist Hew Strachan: "In the ideal model of civil-military relations, the democratic head of state sets out his or her policy, and the armed forces coordinate the means to enable its achievement. The reality is that this process – a process called strategy – is iterative, a dialogue where ends also reflect means, and where the result – also called strategy – is a compromise between the ends of policy and the military means available to implement it."⁷ And, in yet another quote from Hew Strachan, the importance of popular involvement is highlighted.

"If electorates are not informed about and involved in the making of national strategy, they cannot be expected to identify with the objectives of that strategy. Their perceptions, that they believe soldiers are victims, not victors, and that they themselves belong to societies that are inherently casualty averse, become self-fulfilling prophecies because of the poverty of informed debate. That in turn both undermines deterrence and inhibits national leaders from timely action. If potential opponents believe that democracies are inherently risk averse, and unlikely to use force, then democracies' defence policies lack deterrent strength, as both Saddam Hussein and Vladimir Putin seem to have concluded in 2002 and 2013 respectively."⁸

These three quotes inform the author's view of what is required if strategy is to be anything more than hollow rhetoric.

⁶ John Lewis Gaddis, *On Grand Strategy* (New York: Penguin Books: 2019), p. 12.

⁷ Hew Strachan, *The Direction of War: Contemporary Strategy in Historical Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 45.

⁸ Hew Strachan, "Strategy in Theory; Strategy in Practice," *Journal of Strategic Studies* 42:2 (2019), p. 24.



Photo caption: Chilean navy fast attack craft during exercises in 2010. Photo credit: U.S. Navy.

In what follows, on strategies, implementing institutions, and resources, the author analyzes Chile, in comparison with Colombia, Portugal, and the U.S. In each country, he finds that the strategy has some significance, relative to other cases where they have little or none, and there are implementing institutions as well as resources. In each he will attempt to highlight the strengths and weaknesses for each category. It has to be noted that there is so called “hard data” only for resources, in that he draws on *Jane’s Defense Budgets*, but even in this area of “hard data” defense budgets make sense only when the military and other security forces, mainly the *Carbineros* in Chile, roles and missions are taken into consideration.

The ratings for the four countries are summarized in Table 1 at the end of the discussion on strategies, institutions, and resources for the four countries. Strategies will be rated from 1-4 in line with the discussion below on the categories. Implementing institutions are rated from 1-2, with 1 for a functioning Minister of Defense (MOD) and 2 for a MOD plus some kind of operational command of the armed forces. Last, resources are rated 0-1 depending on if there are sufficient funds for the roles and missions adopted by the country.⁹

Strategy

While a great many official government documents have the term “strategy” somewhere in their titles there is, however, a great degree of formalism. Further, not all things that are termed “strategy” are in fact strategy as defined by Gaddis and Strachan above. For example, an annual U.S. *National Security Strategy* is required by Article 603 as codified in Title 50, U.S. Code, article 3043 of the Goldwater-

⁹ The scoring is subjective but the framework highlights what the author believes are the essential requirements for military effectiveness.

Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 which directs the U.S. executive to publish annually a National Security Strategy. Since the end of the Cold War, all U.S. administrations have ignored this requirement. Neither the George W. Bush Administration nor the Barack Obama Administration met the annual requirement as they each published only two during their eight-year administrations. And, in no case were they very useful.¹⁰

Most recently, the general attitude regarding President Donald Trump's *National Security Strategy* of December 2017 is, in the author's opinion, accurately captured by the title of the editorial in the *New York Times* of December 21, 2017 "Forget the Strategy Paper. Watch What He Does."¹¹ Or the section of an article by one of the foremost scholars writing on civil-military relations in Latin America is entitled "White Books and Whitewash,"¹² as white books are generally the title of strategy documents in the region. As a lead-in to the discussion on the *U.S. National Defense Strategy* later in this essay, it seems appropriate to quote the first two lines of the chapter "Restoring Our National Security" by James O. Ellis Jr, James N. Mattis, and Kori Schake. "For the past twenty years, across administrations of both political parties, the United States has been operating largely unguided by strategy. We have been much too reactive to events and crises, and have allowed others to define the perception and outcomes of our engagement around the world, they wrote."¹³

In order to assess the utility of defense, security, military strategy and white books, the author has developed four categories for presenting the material. The first is whether the document is more or less in synch with the roles and missions that are, or realistically could be, implemented by the military. The second is whether they are elaborated involving branches of government beyond the defense ministry. This is relevant as all contemporary military roles and missions necessitate inter-agency cooperation. The third is whether the strategy is disseminated, sooner or later, beyond the limits of the defense and security community to the general population, academia, think tanks, and the like in order to stimulate popular interest and involvement. The fourth is whether they are somehow linked to funding sources so that they can in fact be implemented.

The strategies reviewed are the following: the Chilean Defense Book, *Libro de La Defensa Nacional de Chile* of 2017; the Colombian Democratic Security and Defense Policy (DSP), *Política de Defensa y Seguridad Democrática* of 2003; the Portuguese Strategic Concept of National Defense,

¹⁰ Catherine Dale, "National Security Strategy: Mandates, Execution to Date, and Issues for Congress," *CRS Report for Congress*. Washington, D.C. (06 August 2013), summary.

¹¹ Editorial Staff, "Forget the Strategy Paper. Watch What He Does," *New York Times*, 21 December 2017.

¹² David Pion-Berlin, "Political Management of the Military in Latin America," *Military Review*, 85(1), 2005, p. 30.

¹³ Kori Schake and Jim Mattis, Editors. *Warriors & Citizens: American Views of Our Military* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2016), p. 137.

Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional of 2013; and the *U.S. National Defense Strategy* of 2018.¹⁴ They offer a wide range of the strategic definition of roles and missions. Chile has a “real” military as there are periodic tensions with neighbors who lost territory to Chile in the War of the Pacific in the late 19th Century, but today the main roles and missions are, as noted above, are territorial defense, participating in peacekeeping operations, fighting organized crime and street gangs, and military support to civilian authorities in civil unrest and natural disasters. In Colombia, the main focus in strategy was to combat the illegal armed groups, primarily but not only the FARC and the paramilitaries, and to assert domestic sovereignty over the entire country. Portugal is relatively poor, and while it does possess a few modern military platforms (ships and airplanes), the roles and missions are essentially peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance. The U.S. is the only superpower today, and the military has extremely extensive global missions with particular emphasis today on confining countries such as China and Russia that seek to either limit or overcome the power of the U.S and counter-terrorism, counter-proliferations, and cyber deterrence.

Chile Defense Book

The Chilean Defense book, *Libro de la Defensa Nacional de Chile* of 2017, builds on the basis of the previous Defense Book of 2010, which was based on the progress in civil-military relations after 1997, which was the date of the first Defense Book. The 2017 Defense Book begins the discussion of roles and missions by listing “legitimate Defense” and dissuasion, and then goes on to draw specific attention to peacekeeping missions, human security including fighting organized crime and street gangs, military support to civilian authorities in civil unrest and natural disasters and human, social, and economic rights enforcement. The 2017 Defense Book is clearly in line with what Chile is in fact doing.¹⁵

The 2017 Defense Book has a statement by Minister of Defense José Antonio Gómez describing the process whereby the Book was prepared, and each of the Chilean Defense Books has had an Introduction explaining the process of consultation, which in all cases takes two to three years and involves the interagency, civil society, universities, think tanks, and the Chilean Congress. The 2017 Book also included consultation with the Minister of Defense of Argentina.

The fact of inter-agency coordination in Chile is so prevalent that Solar has coined the term “networked governance” in his article.¹⁶ For example, the 2017 Book states “the country’s security should be achieved through institutions with specific and different responsibilities which the state combined

¹⁴ All of the strategies but for Colombia’s are the most current. The author has included the Colombian strategy document as it was developed to fight the FARC and establish domestic sovereignty, both of which goals were successful, and as it was crucial to convincing the U.S. government to continue funding Colombia’s efforts in this regard. Between 2000 and 2016 these funds totaled \$10 billion. See Thomas Bruneau and Richard Goetze, *From Tragedy to Success in Colombia: The Centrality of Effectiveness in Civil-Military Relations*. (Washington, D.C.: The William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies: 2019), p. 13 and 22-23.

¹⁵ Carlos Solar, “Chile: Defense Governance and Democratic Consolidation,” in Thomas Bruneau and Aurel Croissant, eds. *Civil-Military Relations: Control and Effectiveness across Regimes*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2019.

¹⁶ Carlos Solar, “Chile: Defense Governance and Democratic Consolidation,” in Thomas Bruneau and Aurel Croissant, eds. *Civil-Military Relations: Control and Effectiveness across Regimes*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2019.

with other complimentary state institutions....”¹⁷ As the wide consultation involved very heavily indirectly members of the Chilean Congress, funding is a reasonable expectation. In the Fifth Section of the 2017 Book, consisting of three chapters, the financing of security and defense are dealt with in great detail, and the role of the Chilean Congress figures prominently. In the next section the reader will see extensive mention of the fundamental law defining structures and processes, Law 20424 of February 2, 2010.



Photo caption: Former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe and then-President Juan Manuel Santos shake hands during a meeting in 2016. Santos served as Uribe’s Minister of Defense from 2006-2009. Photo credit: Colombian government.

Colombia

The Colombian Democratic Security and Defense Policy (DSP) was the product and the policy of the Álvaro Uribe administration (2002 – 2010) and it analyzes the situation that the government, with emphasis on the military, had to confront in 2002, and defines the responsibilities of different government actors, including, specifically in Articles 63-65, the Ministry of Defense. It is a very accurate description of the challenges facing the Colombian government, and particularly the military and the police (both under the Ministry of Defense - MOD). The document clearly lays out the Uribe government’s objectives and contained a detailed matrix of what was to be accomplished. This matrix provided a tool that the Colombian population could use to evaluate the Uribe government’s effectiveness. It was written exclusively within the MOD, and only coordinated with other government agencies later. But, a very important fact is that it was written by the civilian Minister of Defense (and currently Vice Presi-

¹⁷ Government of Chile, Defense White Book 2017, p. 98.

dent), Marta Lucía Ramírez, and a small group of civilians, and only later circulated among the higher echelons of the military.

In order to popularize the DSP, and to obtain the population's support, President Uribe travelled all over the country participating in *consejos comunitarios* on Saturdays. The meetings are designed to give ordinary citizens the chance to speak face-to-face with Uribe and his cabinet ministers, who accompany him. The president himself moderates the gatherings, which are marathon affairs that last from 10 to 14 hours and are broadcast by the public television station Señal Colombia.¹⁸ In most instances, the population had never had contact with the government in Bogotá, let alone with the President of the country. Uribe was accompanied by ministers who took down the people's demands, and the President saw that they were fulfilled. President Uribe utilized the DSP not only to encourage the allocation of funds by the U.S., as the U.S. government was confident that with the DSP they were investing in a winner. It was also necessary for President Uribe to convince the Colombian Congress in 2003, again in 2006, and yet again in 2009, to pass legislation imposing wealth taxes, with the last one, in 2009, applicable to 2011-2014, after President Uribe had left office.

Portugal

In April 2013, the Government of Portugal published *Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional* (Strategic Concept of National Defense). It replaced the previous concept of 2003. This fifty-page document is comprehensive, emphasizing that the strategy of national defense must be part of a larger government strategy. Before dealing with the armed forces, the document highlights that diplomacy takes priority. It then highlights the main purpose of the armed forces, which is to “consolidate Portugal in her position as a *coproducer* [co-producer] of international security.” More specifically, it states, “Military means are a fundamental component of security of the State and an element to project the international prestige of Portugal.”

When one examines what the Portuguese military do, which is peace support operations and humanitarian support missions under the UN, NATO, and EU, it is clear that the Strategic Concept is an accurate depiction of what the Portuguese military actually does. The Strategic Concept was elaborated in a “whole of government” approach with heavy involvement of the Foreign Ministry. Further, the final document was discussed in the Assembly of the Republic and approved by the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers on March 21, 2013.¹⁹ The author's interviewees emphasized that the process leading to the publication of the Strategic Concept required a huge amount of involvement by various experts and presentations throughout the country. As the Strategic Concept was discussed in the Assembly of the Republic and approved by the Council of Ministers it means that those involved in the allocation of the government budget approved it.

¹⁸ John C. Dugas “The Emergence of Neopopulism in Colombia? The Case of Álvaro Uribe,” *Third World Quarterly* Vol 24, No 6 (2003), p. 1131.

¹⁹ Ministerio da Defesa Nacional, Portugal, *Conceito Estratégico de Defesa Nacional*, 2013, p. 511.

United States

The unclassified summary of the National Defense Strategy (NDS) of 2018 is readily available online. Undoubtedly the most important message of the NDS is to reorient national defense from the so-called “global war on terrorism” initiated after September 11, 2001 to take into consideration that “...the strategic environment in which the United States must operate is one characterized by the erosion of the rules-based international order, which has produced a degree of strategic complexity and volatility not seen ‘in recent memory’”. As a result, the document argues, the United States must bolster its competitive military advantage - that the NDS sees as having eroded in recent decades - relative to the threats posed by China and Russia. It further maintains that “inter-state strategic competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security.” In this sense, the NDS seeks to reorient the U.S. strategy to global threats.²⁰ The NDS was developed in an iterative process involving Secretary of Defense, General Mattis, USMC (retired), the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the National Security Council (NSC). As the National Security advisor at that time was Lieutenant General McMaster, U.S. Army, and as the NSC’s main role is to coordinate the inter-agency process, the author believes that the NDS was in fact coordinated with other agencies of the U.S. government. Leading up to the publication of the NDS there was no process of public engagement.



Photo caption: The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the service chiefs of each of the branches of the U.S. military listen passively to the 2018 State of the Union speech of the President. Photo credit: CNN.

²⁰ Congressional Research Service, “The 2018 National Defense Strategy: Fact Sheet,” *CRS Report for Congress*. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 05 February 2018).

There are two very relevant facts that must be stated here. First, the inspiration of the NDS is found in a chapter in a book written by General Mattis and colleagues, published in 2016. In “Restoring Our National Security” one can find the main themes of the NDS, and the justification for a new strategy.²¹ Second, as one of those closely involved in the development of the NDS told the author, the public event led by SECDEF Mattis at Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies on January 19, 2018 was the publicity for the NDS. The implementing legislation required the review of the NDS by a National Defense Strategy Commission, composed of twelve prominent retired senior officers and civilians, most of whom are currently active in think tanks, NGOs, and academic programs, that brought a high level of prominence to the NDS, its strengths and weaknesses. However, one of the members of the Commission informed the author that while the Commission had discussed a publicity campaign, for “bureaucratic and personnel reasons” this did not take place. It is worth noting that even General Mattis himself has raised the issue, in the book with Kori Schake. The title of the section tells it all: “An Uninformed but Admiring Public” and they document the general ignorance of the public concerning the military.²² The launching of the NDS, in this case, was a lost opportunity.

The NDS, which is the first National Defense Strategy in ten years, is mandated by Congressional legislation that replaced the Quarterly Defense Review and rewrote the requirements for DOD strategy documents. Specifically, the FY 2017 National Defense Authorization Act amended the legislation “... to require the Secretary of Defense to produce an NDS which articulates how the Department of Defense will advance U.S. objectives...”²³ Therefore, the NDS is intended by Congress to articulate the overall strategic rationale for programs and priorities contained within the FY 2019 – FY 2023 budget requests. Also, the twelve members of the NDS Commission were appointed by key members of the Senate and House Armed Services committees. These facts together mean that the NDS, and the analysis of it by the Commission, translate directly into the overall political process that result in policy and funding.

Implementing Institutions

A strategy is one thing. Implementation, however, depends on both institutions and resources. The vehicle for resources is touched upon in the third category for each country above and will be further discussed in the next section of this paper. Here the discussion concerns implementing institutions.

²¹ Kori Schake and Jim Mattis, Editors. *Warriors & Citizens: American Views of Our Military* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2016).

²² Kori Schake and Jim Mattis, Editors. *Warriors & Citizens: American Views of Our Military* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 2016), p. 289-294.

²³ Congressional Research Service, “The 2018 National Defense Strategy: Fact Sheet,” *CRS Report for Congress*. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 05 February 2018).

Chile

In Chile, both democratic civilian control and military effectiveness are being achieved simultaneously. This is extremely important for the vast majority of newer democracies, including virtually all of Chile's South American neighbors, in which the focus is exclusively on achieving democratic civilian control. In Law 20424 of February 2, 2010, which was promulgated twenty years after the demise of the Pinochet military dictatorship, both the centrality of the civilian led Ministry of Defense and the command of the military structure are defined. Specifically, the civilian Under Secretary of Defense is responsible for political planning, and strategic planning is the responsibility of the Joint Staff (*El Estado Mayor Conjunto*). However, the law also stipulates that the civilian Under Secretary of Defense has oversight of the consistency of strategic planning with political planning. The total civilian and military organizations are exhaustively defined and specified in Chapters VII, VIII, and IX of the 2017 Defense Book. It is worth noting that, in the most thorough recent analysis of the civilian-led Ministry of Defense, Dreisbach finds that the "Ministry of National Defense had taken the lead in developing Chile's defense policies."²⁴

Colombia

In Colombia, the 1991 Constitution stipulated the requirement for a civilian minister of defense. However, in a meeting with President Uribe's first Minister of Defense, Marta Lucía Ramírez on April 4, 2003 she made a telling comment to the author. She said at that time Colombia had a civilian minister of defense but not a civilian ministry of defense. At the request of Minister Ramírez, the author and a colleague performed a detailed study of the Ministry that confirmed the Minister's observation. While the 2003 DSP was written by civilians in the MOD, and not surprisingly strongly emphasized a central role for the MOD in coordinating national security and defense to implement the government's national security policies, the key positions were occupied by active duty or retired military officers. Civilian salaries were about two-thirds the salaries in other ministries (because the MOD was still assumed to be staffed by active duty or retired military officers) which resulted in rapid turnover of the two vice-MODs, for example.

²⁴ Tristan Dreisbach, *Civilians at the Helm: Chile Transforms its Ministry of National Defense, 2010-2014*. Innovations for Successful Societies; (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University, 2015), p. 1.



Photo caption: Former Colombian Minister of Defense (MOD) and current Vice President Marta Lucia-Ramirez greets U.S. Air Force personnel delivering humanitarian aid to the Colombian-Venezuelan border in February 2019. Photo credit: U.S. Air Force Major Wayne Capps.

Since that time, the MOD has become robust particularly under the leadership of Minister of Defense Juan Manuel Santos, 2006 – 2010. By robust, it is meant the institution develops and implements the DSP and follow-on national security strategies. It did this first through the actions of two extremely gifted and capable Vice Ministers of Defense whom at the time of Santos were Sergio Jaramillo and Juan Carlos Pinzón. Both were supported by an excellent staff of civilians familiar with security and defense issues. It is very important to note that Juan Manuel Santos was conversant with issues in national security and defense, and when Santos was elected president, Pinzón replaced him as MOD. The lower level civilian staff has benefited from short courses on national security and defense in the U.S., and probably in other countries.²⁵

There is, however, a major problem. While the MOD does have highly qualified civilian staff, there is no other institution, in either the executive branch or the legislative branch, which is conversant with issues of defense or national security. During the Presidency of Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) he ran the war against the armed actors on his own, using his cell phone and dispensing with the National Security Council. In demanding results from the military commanders, and similar to the U.S. during the Viet Nam War in measuring success by body counts of assumed enemy combatants, there resulted a situation of “false positives”. U.S. military observers in Colombia told the author that brigade commanders lived in terror of President Uribe’s phone calls. Armed with encyclopedic knowledge of local

²⁵ Thomas Bruneau and Richard Goetze, *From Tragedy to Success in Colombia: The Centrality of Effectiveness in Civil-Military Relations*. (Washington, D.C.: The William J. Perry Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies: 2019), p. 18-19.

crime and terrorism statistics, he hounded commanders for action and results - and he got them. Even as the security situation improved, President Uribe still pressed the military for results. This worked if the commander was in a guerrilla-rich region, but not if the division was in a relatively calm area. In response to the demands, and a variety of cash and other incentives, commanders and soldiers responded. This evolved into a situation where low-level criminals were killed around Bogotá and the bodies shipped to other areas so the forces could produce the “*bajas*” the President sought. It is estimated that between 2002 and 2008, some 3,000 innocent civilians were murdered. Once this became known, it resulted in the scandal of *los falsos positivos*. The scandal led to a report for the UN General Assembly and further complicated the already complicated negotiation for a peace agreement with the FARC. The upshot was that at least 800 military personnel were imprisoned. While the investigations and reports do not attribute the false positives to President Uribe, or the Minister of Defense, his demand for body count ultimately resulted in major ethical and moral problems for the Colombian armed forces, further complicating the peace process.

Portugal

Previous to the basic laws of defense in 1993, the *Estado-Maior General das Forças Armadas* (CEMGFA) enjoyed extensive powers in all aspects of defense. The 1993 laws transferred all powers, but for those directly related to operations and war planning, to the Ministry of Defense (MDN). Further, the 1993 laws limited the CEMGFA’s operational role to situations of war and states of siege or emergency. These cases are few and far between, but what are fairly common are decisions on sending troops abroad to participate in peace keeping and humanitarian relief missions. In a later law of 2003, the CEMGFA has explicit powers in both war and peace. The law of September 2014 expands these powers. Now all that is operational, which means with militaries almost everything, has to be done by the CEMGFA.

Before the most recent law, the missions largely depended on the service chiefs. To increase the powers of the CEMGFA was a difficult political challenge as the service chiefs were not eager to lose power to one superior official, who, in two thirds of the cases, would be from another military service. Before the September 2014 law, he was *primus inter pares*. The Chief continues to have operational command when Portuguese troops are deployed abroad and the 2014 law reinforced his powers. It should be noted that all of the interviewees emphasized that the CEMGFA is responsible to the civilian minister. Indeed, the Organic Law Number 5/2014 of August 29, 2014 states, in Article 23(1), “The Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces depends directly on the Ministry of Defense in terms of the competences defined in law.” In his analysis of the decision-making systems of Portugal and Spain, Arteaga highlights the similarities in the two countries regarding civilian control, via the ministries of defense, and operational control via the chiefs of general staff.²⁶

²⁶ Felix Arteaga, “Spain and Portugal,” in Hugo Meijer and Marco Wyss, editors, *The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces*. (London: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 143.

United States

The last major reform of the implementing institutions for national security and defense in the U.S. was the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. At the time, Goldwater-Nichols (G-N) made major and, most would argue at least in retrospect, necessary changes to the structures and processes of national security and defense in the U.S. G-N was enacted during the Cold War, and with the much increased complexity of security challenges since that time, including terrorism, failed states, unending wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, and the emergence of China and Russia as competitors, there have been a huge number of proposals to revise G-N. In his *Patriots for Profit*, the author describes and analyzes five of the major proposals.²⁷ A more recent *Congressional Research Service Report to Congress*, “Goldwater-Nichols at 30: Defense Reform and Issues for Congress,” devotes sixteen pages of “Select Defense Management and Organizational Reform Proposals since the 1980s.”²⁸ So far, however, there has not been sufficient consensus or political will to change the structure and processes, nor have the military failures been perceived as serious as those leading up to the very difficult enactment of G-N in 1986. Further, in comparison with most other countries, there is at least a system in place even if critics rightfully point to problems including the following: inefficiencies, slowness, undue complexity, and high costs.²⁹

Resources

Obviously nothing can be implemented without resources and a researcher will of necessity have to assess the roles and missions implemented by the military to determine if the budget, measured in terms of percentage of the GDP, is sufficient. Utilizing *Jane's Defense Budgets* for 2019 the results for defense budgets as percentage of Gross Domestic Product is as follows: Chile 1.7%, Colombia 1.8%, Portugal 1.1%, and the U.S. 3.3%.³⁰ Again, it must be reiterated that the resources need be understood in terms of the roles and missions in fact implemented by the military, which have been discussed in the previous section on strategies. For example, according to one source, between 1995 and 2015 funds originating from the Copper Law amounted to \$17,456,000,000.³¹ The funds were used to buy platforms for the three services, which arguably has the most modern air force, army, and navy in Latin America.

²⁷ Thomas Bruneau, *Patriots for Profit: Contractors and the Military in U.S. National Security*. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), p. 104.

²⁸ Kathleen J. McInnis, “Goldwater-Nichols at 30: Defense Reform and Issues for Congress,” *CRS Report for Congress*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service (CRS), 02 June 2016.

²⁹ Kathleen J. McInnis, “Goldwater-Nichols at 30: Defense Reform and Issues for Congress,” *CRS Report for Congress*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service (CRS), 02 June 2016.

³⁰ *Jane's Defense Budgets*, 2019.

³¹ Carlos Solar and Gregory Weeks “Military austerity in small, high income, and peaceful countries.” Unpublished paper, no date.



Photo caption: Chilean Army soldiers rescue stranded bus passengers after a winter snow storm trapped their vehicle along the Chilean-Bolivian border in July 2011. Photo credit: Chile Hoy.

While there is ample room for disagreement, military officers generally consider that they do not have enough resources to implement their assigned missions. In the case of these four countries, however, in two there are even more serious, if pending, concerns. In July 2019, the Chilean Congress approved a proposal to develop a new means to finance military acquisitions. The law provides for the creation of a contingency fund (*fondo de contingencia*), and reaffirms the extensive and very positive terms of the Chilean Defense Book.³² However, as Solar and Weeks note, it remains to be seen if the new procedure with the *fondo de contingencia* provides sufficient funds for the Chilean military to continue to implement a fairly wide scope of roles and missions. In Portugal, considering the very small GDP of \$229 billion and that defense receives only 1.1% of that, there is very little for defense in general.

According to ex-Minister of Defense Nuno Severiano Teixeira, there are three implications.³³ First, there are fewer members of the military which were 47,000 at the turn of the century, 38,000 in 2015, and decreased to 31,000 in 2019. Second, they have stopped modernization, including of helicopters and the logistics ship; and the *Lei de Programação Militar* is on hold. Third, there is a reduction in the international missions. They had some 822 troops doing these in 2006, in 2012 there were 468,

³² Government of Chile, Defense White Book, 2017.

³³ Teixeira N. Severiano and A. Santos Pinto. *European Defence in Time of Austerity: The Case of Southern Europe*. European University Institute; Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Global Governance Programme, RSCAS Policy Paper, 2014.

and in 2017 there were 346.³⁴ The Spanish researcher Arteaga uses the term “symbolic character” as a consequence of the economic crisis in Portugal.³⁵

Analysis

Based upon the discussion above, the ratings for the four countries regarding the essential requirements for effectiveness are displayed in Table 1. As previously mentioned, strategies will be rated from 1-4 in line with the discussion below on the categories. Implementing institutions are rated from 1-2, with 1 for a functioning Minister of Defense (MOD) and 2 for a MOD plus some kind of operational command of the armed forces. Last, resources are rated 0-1 depending on if there are sufficient funds for the roles and missions adopted by the country.

Table 1 - Essential Requirements for Effectiveness				
Country	Strategy (1-4)	Institutions (1-2)	Resources (0-1)	Total (2-7)
Chile	4	2	1	7
Colombia	4	1	1	6
Portugal	4	2	0	6
United States	3	2	1	6

As is obvious, utilizing the framework for analysis proposed by the author, Chile has the highest rating for effectiveness.

Conclusion

As it is virtually impossible to define let alone measure “effectiveness,” this paper argues for an essential elements approach to both control and effectiveness. Control is relatively easy to conceptualize and define, and to identify the relevant institutions, and in Chile they are present and functioning.³⁶ Therefore, the focus in this paper is on the requirements for military effectiveness. As the only “hard” data is percentage of GDP, most of the discussion is about implementing institutions and strategies. And, as the term strategy is so malleable as to be useless, the author has focused on countries to compare and contrast to Chile that have implemented what he believes are relatively sound strategies utilizing four categories. It must be recognized that countries implement different roles and missions, as evidenced by the strategies, and the percentage of GDP must be understood in terms of the roles and missions actually implemented.

³⁴ Estado-Maior General das Forças Armadas (EMGFA). Website of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Portugal, 2019.

³⁵ Felix Arteaga, “Spain and Portugal,” in Hugo Meijer and Marco Wyss, editors, *The Handbook of European Defence Policies and Armed Forces*. (London: Oxford University Press, 2018), p. 156.

³⁶ Carlos Solar, “Chile: Defense Governance and Democratic Consolidation,” in Thomas Bruneau and Aurel Croissant, eds. *Civil-Military Relations: Control and Effectiveness across Regimes*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2019.

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**William J. Perry Center
for Hemispheric Defense Studies**
<http://www.williamjperrycenter.org/>
260 5th Avenue, Building 64
Abraham Lincoln Hall, Fort McNair
Washington, D.C. 20319-5066