

# ***Transformation vs. Amalgamation- A Policy Perspective on the Divergent Roles of the Military and the Police in Small Developing Countries: The Case of Jamaica***

**Hilton A. McDavid, DSc.**

The University of the West Indies, Mona - Kingston

## **INTRODUCTION**

Naim (2003) points out that the illegal trade in drugs, arms, intellectual property, people, and money is booming and like the war on terrorism, the fight to control these illicit markets pits governments against agile, stateless, and resourceful networks empowered by globalization. He opines that governments will continue to lose these wars until they adopt new strategies to deal with a larger, unprecedented struggle that now shapes the world as much as confrontations between nation-states once did.

Colombian President Alvaro Uribe called on OAS Member States to continue the fight against terrorism affecting the hemisphere, recently at the sixth annual meeting of the Inter American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE) in Bogotá from March 22, 2006 to March 24, 2006. At this meeting the Member States expressed their concerns regarding emergent threats such as attacks on financial systems, tourist areas, Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), and digital networks<sup>1</sup>.

From a strategic context, states regardless of their size and population must be wary of the current and rising asymmetric threats, the blurry line dividing criminal threats and war, and the victimizing of civilians, particularly as third party targets. This should be of specific concern to tourism dependent economies such as Jamaica, as tourists as third party targets have been attacked in Bali (2003 and 2005) and Egypt (1997, 2005 and April 2006).

Despite this, some Jamaican politicians, policymakers and intellectuals have been clamouring for the disbandment of the Jamaica Defence Force (JDF) or its absorption into the Jamaica Constabulary Force (JCF), the national police (Seaga, 2005). This is based on the failure to understand both the current security threat and the differing roles and functions of the military and the police. For instance, Harriott (2002) limits his analysis by considering only that there are no significant external military threats to Jamaica's territorial integrity. Thus totally ignoring asymmetric military threats from non-state actors, and he also does not consider organized crime in the current transnational crime security environment as a threat to national security.

In addition to Jamaica is currently enduring an intolerable level of violence and criminal activity in the society. The growth of criminal activity in Jamaica is weakening state authority, as gangs and criminal syndicates exert control over certain communities, and arms and drug trafficking have become more prevalent. This has reduced the State's ability to deliver political goods—security, education, health services, economic opportunity and fundamental infrastructural requirements. What is dangerous is that the Government of Jamaica is increasingly forfeiting its

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<sup>1</sup> CICTE Informe 32, March 2006. It should be noted that Jamaica is a member of the OAS and CICTE.

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function as provider of political goods, particularly security, to criminal gang leaders and terrorist leaders who the society, but especially beneficiaries in relevant communities, glorifies and romanticises as “dons”<sup>2</sup>. It is thus essential that this drift be reversed and the State restores control over the entire country. The major force in this “retaking” and “maintaining” has to be the military. It is essential to point out that force does not necessarily always mean violence. Force is best exerted by the military when they remain in the barracks and the threat of their existence or threats of their use are sufficient.

The May 2005 attack on the Cross Roads Police Station in Kingston by criminals<sup>3</sup> resulting in the death of a policeman is criminal terrorism and should be treated and dealt with as such. It is significant to note, that the provision of security is the most central and foremost political good<sup>4</sup> and to this end, one of the theses of this paper is that the security forces in Jamaica should be strengthened and in so doing the military must remain a separate disciplined force set apart from the Jamaican Constabulary.

### *Aim and Scope*

The aim and scope of the paper is to analyse and link the hemispheric threats of the nation states of the Caribbean, to National Security and the differing roles of the police and military services. The paper argues that the concomitancy of appropriate training to functions is critical and herein lies one of the major differences and roles of the military and police. The type of discipline displayed by the military can only be achieved through particular training, which would be inappropriate and contradictory to the functioning of the police force dealing with civilians and society in general on a regular and daily basis. This type of discipline which is unique to the military is defined by its nature and specificity and is referred to in this paper as Continually Reinforced Functional Discipline (CRFD).

## SECURITY AND THE STATE

The modern state, deploying large armies, taxation power, and a centralised bureaucracy that could exercise sovereign authority over a large territories, has most of its origin in Europe dating back four or five hundred years to the consolidation of the French, Spanish and Swedish. The rise of these states with their ability to provide order, security, law and property rights is often credited with the rise of the modern economic world Monarchies(Fukuyama, 2004). In Jamaica and many developing countries much of the fear over strengthening the state is based on the fact that the same coercive power that can allow the state to protect property rights and provide public safety allows it to abuse the rights of citizens. Duncan (1987) criticises Caribbean governments as being too ready to use the means of legitimate physical compulsion to intimidate, victimise and even murder opponents and suggests that the best guarantee of internal security is for Caribbean Governments to govern justly and effectively.

This fear of abuse along with ignorance of the functions of the state, security, threat, and military operations have also led some intellectuals and academics in developing countries to call for the disbanding of the military and the absorption of some of the existing forces into the police service.

The main functions of the state are the provision of “security” and “justice”, addressing the social and economic well being of all citizens, and the stabilizing of good governance and ensuring the participatory process(Rothberg,2003). In the strengthening of the state, we must succeed in these four areas.

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<sup>2</sup> A community Leader with strong links to the criminal underworld who ruthlessly enforces his rule over the community

<sup>3</sup> Reported in the Jamaica Gleaner, May 05, 2005

<sup>4</sup> Fukuyama, 2004

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According to Hamre and Sullivan (2003), security addresses all aspects of public safety, in particular creating a safe and secure environment and developing legitimate and effective security institutions. Justice must include the strengthening of the legal system for it to be more accountable, creating an effective law enforcement apparatus, an open judicial system, fair laws and a humane correction system. In many ways security is the precursor to “economic well being” as this extends from protecting the population from starvation, diseases, and the elements to long term social and economic development.

In his definition of security, Griffith (2004d) addresses the protection and preservation of people's freedom from internal subversion and the erosion of cherished political, economic and social values. He further defines values to include democratic choice, political stability, sustainable development, free enterprise, social equality and respect for human rights. He thus considers security to be multidimensional with military political and other dimensions. However, Vascianne (2004) points out that even though some of these dimensions raise difficult questions of social policy for Caribbean societies, redesignating them as security questions will probably not do much to promote conceptual clarity and may undermine the credibility of arguments on Caribbean security.

These four functions are undeniable, inextricably linked and their abilities to support nation building and the strengthening of the state are dependent on successful integration and interaction among them. Despite this, security which encompasses the provision of collective and individual security to the citizenry and to the assistors is the continuous footing on which progress in other issue areas rests. Feil (2002) defines security comprehensively as a concept that addresses all aspects of public safety, particularly the establishment of a safe and secure environment and the development of legitimate and stable security institutions. Indeed this includes securing the lives of the people from immediate and large scale violence and maintaining the state's ability to defend and to keep its territorial integrity. These security tasks may be categorised as:

- reform of domestic security institutions;
- regional security;
- control of belligerence;
- territorial security;
- protection of the people and
- protection of key persons, infrastructure and institutions.

These tasks are effectively carried out when law enforcement consisting of the military, police, corrections, customs and immigration are properly coordinated and work closely together. Each of these has its specific role, with the military well suited to coercion, deterrence, and the imposition of order.

### THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THE THREAT

#### *Overview-Jamaica*

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**Table 1.: Selected Country Variables**

Selected Country Variables	Statistics (2004)
Area sq. km	10991
Land sq. km	10831
Water sq. km	160
Population	2 650 900
Real GDP growth rate	1.3%
Police to Citizenry Ratio	1:327
Crime Rate	1351 per 100 000
Murder Rate	55 per 100 000

Source: PIOJ (2004), CIDA (2006) and UN Statistics (2004)

According to table 1, with an area of 10,991 sq km, 10,831 sq km being land and 160 sq km being water (World Fact Book, 2004) and a total population of 2 650 900 (PIOJ, 2004) Jamaica is the third largest island in the Caribbean. Jamaica has strong democratic traditions, and high life expectancy and literacy rates (CIDA, 2006). However, in 2004 real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 1.3 percent was recorded, which represented a slowing down in the growth momentum as in 2003 the country had recorded GDP growth rate at 2.3 percent (UN statistics, 2004). This can be attributed to the recent economic difficulties that have contributed to the challenges faced by the country in pursuing economic development. Such challenges include the high rates of crime and violence.

Based on 2001 data, Jamaica has the largest police force (7,756) among the CARICOM group of countries, along with the largest military force of 2,830 officers and persons (Griffith, 2004d). The JDF consists of the army, which has a small air arm with light fixed wing aircraft and medium and light rotary wing aircraft, and the coastguard.

### *Crime and Violence*

According to the Planning Institute of Jamaica (in 2005), with the police to citizenry ratio being 1:327, crimes reported had increased by 14.4 percent resulting in an overall crime rate of 1 351 per 100 000 population when compared with 1 195 per 100 000 in 2003. Similarly, for the year 2004 major crimes against persons had increased by 26.9 percent, while the murder rate increased by 52.9 per cent to 55 per 100 000. 50 percent of the perpetrators were from the age cohort 16-25 years. In 2004 there were 6,518 major crimes<sup>5</sup> reported. Of these there were 1,471 murders. (PIOJ, 2005)

Offences reported against properties increased by 23.4 percent in 2004 when compared to its previous years. There were significant increases in burglaries, 46.8 percent and house breaking, 31.2 over the said period (PIOJ, 2005).

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<sup>5</sup> Major crimes are murder, shooting, carnal knowledge and robbery, arson. Breaches of the dangerous drug laws and the firearm act are considered as miscellaneous offences. Manslaughter and felonious wounding are considered as other offenses against persons and not as major crimes

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World Bank (2004) describes Jamaica as being among the most violent countries in the world and points out that in 2000 the recorded intentional homicide rate of 33 per 100,000 inhabitants was lower only than Colombia (63) and South Africa (52). The number of murders in 2004 is estimated at 1471 persons.

The Bank reports that the Government of Jamaica spends 3 percent of GDP on crime control and estimates that violent crimes cost the country 0.6% of GDP in 2001 in terms of lost production and health expenses due to mortality and injury.

### *The Threat*

The trend in Jamaica and the Caribbean points to significant increases in *consensual crimes* (such as drug possession and trafficking), *expressive crimes* (such as assaults and murder) and *property crimes*. Much of the consensual crimes in Jamaica have both causal and consequential linkages to the drug phenomenon. Griffith (1997) provides credible evidence of this nexus. Of grave concern is the militarization of the threat and narco-terrorism. The strong linkages are between the domestic crime and the international environment of transnational criminal networks.

The threats to Jamaica have three main features:

- largely transnational with local, regional and international aspects;
- multidimensional in scope and impact and
- multi-faceted moving beyond the militarization.

The major vulnerabilities and attractiveness to terrorism are our geopolitical linkages, particularly our geographical location, and strategic material (bauxite). During the period 1997–2000, Jamaica provided 26 percent of US total bauxite imports and 8 percent of alumina imports (Griffith, 2004). This is combined with the prominence of the tourism industry which provides third party targets, our political and cultural openness, and US trade and investments in the country. The terrorism connection of offshore banking is very relevant to the region but is of limited concern to Jamaica.

In general terms, Jamaica's vulnerability to terrorism is driven by its proximity to the United States of America and its geopolitical relationships and as Griffith (2004) points out, in post 9/11 context there is new vulnerability sensitivity and this time the potential to penetrate the US homeland from the Caribbean is emphasized. This has been emphasized several times recently with incidents such as armed defectors from Cuba, Haitian refugees, and fishermen landing in sensitive military areas in Florida, USA.

Jamaica like the rest of the region is prone to natural disasters, hurricanes, earthquakes, landslides, flooding etc., but an important aspect of this threat is also being able to respond to the need for assistance in friendly territories. Even if, Jamaica is spared, it is expected that the military would go to the assistance of other CARICOM countries that may not have been so fortunate. The CARICOM countries have shown this willingness to assist each other with military deployments as demonstrated by Barbados, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago and the OECS countries to Grenada in the aftermath of hurricane IVAN in 2004.

Another major threat the nation faces which is tied to both natural and manmade disasters is that of a refugee crisis. Our proximity to Haiti, Dominican Republic and Cuba makes it an easy destination for citizens fleeing disasters in these countries. One may opine that improvements in the Jamaican economy may very well result in an increase in the number of refugees to the island.

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Finally it is imperative that it is reemphasise that the Jamaican economy is becoming increasingly dependent on tourism, and the American and European tourist are third party targets for radical Islamist terrorist. Undoubtedly, because of the new vulnerabilities and threats facing small developing countries such as Jamaica, it is necessary to revisit the role and structure of the military to increase their capacity to deal with the situation

### DIVERSE ROLES AND FUNCTIONS OF THE POLICE AND THE MILITARY

#### *Functions and Training of the Police versus the Role and Training of the Military*

It is argued that the general functions of the police require a much different type of training than the military. The police in dealing with incidents/situations must have a long term view unlike the military which is short term, dealing with the specific incident. This is driven by the fact that the constabulary units are responsible for an area on a long term basis and the military is only in the location for a specific period. Indeed the preferred tactics of the military in internal security operations is often referred to as “shock and awe”. In addition, law enforcement is operating in an era of community policing and policing by consent. This is not the natural environment of the soldier.

One must be cognisant of the reality that in his daily operations the constable answers to the law and his own conscious whilst the soldier’s responsibility is to his superiors and general military rules and international agreements. The operations of the military in an internal security environment should be characterised by reinforcement of the police, rapidly and in considerable strength and their tasks should be to create the conditions for policing. On the other hand the police are expected to be flexible and responsive. The tactics and skill sets required by police constable include discretion, independent action, independent decision making. The private soldier generally operates in a command and control system mainly in a squad/group controlled by an on-the-scene superior, and seldom as an individual. Thus the training of these differing services must emphasize their different roles and functions.

As Ruth and Reitz (2003) put it, when on patrol the police has a constant and even bizarre mixture of missions, carried out with society’s authorisation to use force when necessary and conjoined with an officer’s fear of possible serious injury or death, involve difficult roles that few professions require. He is expected to prevent crime, protect life and property, arrest law violators, assist the public, preserve the public peace, regulate public conduct and control and expedite the flow of traffic.

Bittner (2000) suggests that the role of the police is best understood as a mechanism for distributing nonnegotiable coercive force with only an instant’s grasp of each situation’s demands. He concludes that as a police officer fulfils disparate missions such as stopping a speeding vehicle, intervening in a violent or potentially violent domestic dispute, confronting children molesting the elderly or contending with a mentally ill person, the ultimate result of each encounter depends on the officer’s possession of, and ability use some degree of authorised coercive force. In many instances the policeman also has to perform some of the duties of social workers, psychiatrists, psychologists and emergency medical professionals.

In order to successfully carry out their duties the policemen have to be trained to use their educated judgement to choose widely from an extraordinary range of possible discretionary acts. This often requires them to wait patiently, resisting fear and rejecting the temptation to employ coercive force before other alternatives have failed. This represents a significant difference in the functions and training between the police and the military.



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### *Norms and Social Capital in the Military*

Grace Kennedy Ltd. or Super Clubs, two of major Caribbean firms with interests throughout the region could not provide sufficient individual economic incentives to motivate their employees to risk their lives for their organisation or the country. Yet the military can do so using symbols such as medals which have no extrinsic value. It is best said that the military creates the motivation by replacing individual identities with group identities and reinforcing group identities through tradition, ceremony, and group experiences that are meant to bond soldiers emotionally. Research has shown that the commitment quite often is not to the country but to squad and as Fukuyama (2004) points out the strongest bonds are not to large organisations or abstract causes like the nation, rather they are to the immediate groups of soldiers in one's platoon.

Only through the repeated reinforcement of these groups' ties can individuals be made to overcome their natural fear of death. This distinguishes the military from the civilian police force. Indeed their duty and tasking require policemen to operate alone or in pairs and policemen unlike soldiers must be trained to master a variety of skills which are based on their relationship, "interface" and "interaction" with the public. The military on the other hand must maintain its coercive power and ultimate capability of providing a much higher level of force than the police. This highlights the significant differences in the organisational culture of the two services; not withstanding the fact that policing does call for a degree of courage.

Winslow (1998) suggests that cohesion and loyalty, which are considered important components of combat effectiveness, are reinforced by Canadian Military Culture, particularly the Regimental system of the Canadian Army. The army places special emphasis on reinforcing unit bonding, team playing and supporting one's comrades, particularly when under fire. One key element of unit bonding is regimental culture, which emphasises group solidarity and cohesion. The regiment of the Jamaica Defence Force has its own cultural phenomena, which have depth, duration and collective meaning that were inherited from the British West India Regiment. The unit's major celebration is Victoria Cross Day, which recognises the West Indian recipients of the most senior medal of courage in the British Commonwealth. The importance attributed to custom and tradition that can to some degree be inferred from their extensiveness and regimental traditions, play an important role in the development of regimental ethos which leads to strong interpersonal relationships, unit cohesion and loyalty. As Winslow (1998) puts it, loyalty is encouraged at all levels as military values and structures grant primacy to collective goals. Individuals exhibit strong group allegiances and strong social control over the individual member is exerted by the group. In the military group allegiance is essential for combat effectiveness. Military culture emphasises belongingness while training rewards group performances.

The military training system is designed to continually emphasise teamwork, team spirit, bonding and loyalty.

### *Continually Reinforced Functional Discipline*

The military by virtue of the combination of their continuous training and their operating in teams (squads) are provided with a type of discipline that not only induces them to act with courage, but strengthens their mental fitness so that they can deal with the harshest physical, psychological and emotional environments. This is critical when facing the devastation of natural disasters and mass violence from public unrest. Under the first situation, the "first responders" may very well be victims themselves. Time and the mode of operations of the police do not permit that type of continuous training, and to do so would simply be to convert police units into military organizations while being structures of the Jamaican Constabulary Force.

It is this same discipline and training that make the military more suitable for dealing with certain internal security threats, particularly when the miscreants are organised, operating in groups (squads), are determined and are capable of producing sustained fire on security force's

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positions. The discipline to be exhibited here is to be able to take sustained fire and even casualties and still maintain composure and retaliate appropriately whilst reducing collateral damage (for example, through aimed fire) and economising effort. This type of discipline is only attained through repeated combat drills supported by rehearsals and simulations of incidents.

A key difference between the roles and functions of the police and the military is that the military require a very high level of CFRD. Discipline in the discipline services (military, police, corrections and fire) can be divided into two categories:

- Formal Service Discipline (FSD)
- CFRD

The term military discipline can be considered a fusion of the two with a very high level of CFRD, and the military hierarchy, military law, rules, regulations and norms being used to reinforce and maintain the two types as one. According to Batmazov (2003), military discipline is one of the major factors determining combat readiness and combat efficiency. This truth has stood the test of history on many occasions and it is no coincidence that military leaders and commanders have always regarded a tightening of discipline among the troops as a task of paramount importance. Military discipline can also be understood as the absorption and consistent use of those principles that ensure both aggression and appropriate restraint in military missions (Casey, 1999). However, it is CFRD component that provides the major difference in the cultures of the police and the military.

FSD which should be demonstrated by both the military and police has as its psychological foundation a specific set of personal and interpersonal structures and processes in mental regulation, which secure normative behaviour<sup>6</sup>. This form of discipline can be interpreted as an accumulation of knowledge, development of views and convictions, cultivation of positive attitudes to the performance of official duties, and the translation of the requirements of discipline into value orientations and internal regulators of behaviour<sup>7</sup>. On the other hand, CFRD is a complex system of attributes and properties such as promptitude, self-possession, exactitude, bravery, endurance and courage. CFRD can be characterised primarily as a social knowledge based structure enclosing a certain amount of information about FSD, an awareness of the need for it and an understanding of its usefulness, justice, role and importance in enhancing the strength and combat readiness of troops.

CFRD creates certain behaviours in the military such as automatic subconscious regulation, with an appeal to knowledge only in the case of the unexpected difficulties. Automatically performed actions are often critical for survival and the success of the mission. An integral component of CFRD is habit. Volkov (2005) considers that habit is such a level of fulfilment of the requirements of military disciplinary by the serviceman that this becomes a need for him. Habit consolidates the existing forms of behaviour, to some extent automatises the servicemen's actions in observing the rules and standards of conduct established in the military and removes the need for him to think about and analyse each concrete move. It is through CFRD that mechanical solidarity is achieved, where soldiers are highly motivated and willing to continue fighting in spite of continuous odds. Officers and soldiers are expected to respect values and norms that transcend individual self-interest in favour of a presumed higher goal.

CFRD can only be achieved through a training system that emphasises continuity in a culture of repetition. When the term continually reinforced functional discipline is used it refers to the continual repetitive training that is done on both daily and periodic bases. Contrary to some opinions that the soldiers are doing nothing when in barracks, they are undergoing some form of

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<sup>6</sup> Batmazov (2005) makes this point when discussing military discipline of enlistees in general terms.

<sup>7</sup> Volkov (2005) discards this approach when discussing his concept of self-discipline.



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necessary training and preparation. The roles and function of the police do not require such an approach and neither would it be cost-effective as little time would be available for them to carry out their duties.

It is true that some countries, Costa Rica, Haiti, and Panama choose to abolish the armed forces entirely and maintain only the police; however as is the case with Costa Rica and Panama, "the military by any other name will smell of the same combat power". Both of these countries have units that are not referred to as military but have the combat power of at least the "light infantry"<sup>8</sup>, which is similar to the regiment of the Jamaica Defence Force. Undoubtedly though, the role of the military, its training and equipment should be more relevant to the security and development needs of Jamaica.

### TRANSFORMATION OF THE MILITARY IN JAMAICA TO BE MORE RELEVANT

#### *Background*

Paying particular attention to the current and future threats facing Small Island Developing States, including that of natural and manmade disasters, the military has to be transformed to be an effective counter to the violence, while at the same time being able to respond effectively to disasters. To be effective counter to the asymmetric threats, transnational crime and terrorism, the major applications of coercion, deterrence, compellence and swaggering has to be strengthened whilst being made more relevant during transformation. These maintain their relevance for both external and internal threats.

However, we cannot ignore the potential major roles of the military in economic development; and disaster prevention, preparedness, response and emergency management.

#### *Coercion and Deterrence*

States use their military power more frequently in the peaceful than in the forceful mode. When used peacefully, states employ their military power in more subtle, and therefore in less well-defined modes. According to Art (2004a<sup>9</sup>), used peacefully, military power is held at the ready, and its exact influence on political outcomes becomes more difficult to trace. The peaceful use of military power is analogous to a gravitational field among large objects in space: it affects all motion that takes place, but produces its effect imperceptibly. This is most pertinent in the internal security environment. It is imperative that when analysing the military power we do not simply equate it solely with its physical use, which is the pitfall that policy makers and academics in Jamaica and the Caribbean are falling into, as military power should shape outcomes more when the army is credibly threatening from the barracks, rather than actually deployed to face either an external or internal threat.

The coercive power of the state is critical in maintaining a stable democracy where property rights are not assaulted and destroyed by criminals and as

Political structures, both domestic and international cannot exist apart from it. Within a state, if any group can dictate events by employing force, public order will collapse, might will be right and internecine violence will be pervasive until lines are drawn and power balances are established in a very unstable environment. When the coercive power of the state breaks down, force becomes privatised and force in private hands creates gangsterism. To a much lesser

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<sup>8</sup> SERPAJ-Costa Rica (1997)

<sup>9</sup> Art, Robert. 2004 (a). The Fungibility of Force. In *The use of Force: Military Power and International Politics*, edited by Art, Robert and Kenneth Waltz. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., pp 3-4

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extent this may well be the case in certain areas in Jamaica which are controlled by criminal gangsters that are romanticised as “area leaders” and “dons” and these situations have the grave potential of degenerating. Force publicly held creates government and it is a government’s legitimate monopoly in the use of force that creates the social foundation for a stable domestic political order.

Deterrence in the internal security environment relates to the peaceful employment of force, where the threat of unacceptable punishment is directed at the criminals and adversaries. This requires that laws, particularly those regarding sentencing be promulgated. It is not just the capture that should deter but unacceptable punishment should be imminent. In addition, the adversaries must realize that in any violent clashes with the military they will be destroyed.

As regards, border protection, illegal harvesters of marine products must realize that when caught their vessels and catch will be seized, along with fines and imprisonment for the captain and crew, which might be considered as unacceptable punishment by the “perpetrators”. The success of a deterrent threat is measured by it not having to be used (at least not too often) and by its credible nature. Unfortunately, the JDF is employed on a daily basis in “aid to the civil power”, assisting the police in anti-crime operations.

### *Compellence*

Art (2004b) suggests that the distinction between compellence and deterrence is one between the active and passive use of force. The success of compellant action is measured by how closely and quickly the adversary conforms to laws and regulation, and the stipulated wishes of the state. In internal security operations, this may mean the employment of curfews and “seek and destroy” operations to achieve such authoritativeness.

### *Swaggering*

The obvious and most visual role of the military in small developing states is that of “swaggering” -- the precision drills on parades, the display of weaponry, demonstrations, military exercises and manoeuvres often used. The main objective of swaggering is to instil confidence of the people in their military and to enhance the prestige of the state.

This suggests that swaggering is pursued because of the fundamental yearning of the states for respect and prestige and they do so “on the cheap”. An important aspect of swaggering is that when the state’s image is enhanced, the nation’s border protection, deterrent and compellant capabilities are also enhanced. Swaggering in small developing countries is quite often misconstrued because by its nature, is most comprehensive and yet diffuse, and policymakers do not quite understand its effects on border protection, deterrence and compellence, particularly the latter two in internal security. Swaggering in the context of the JDF is not understood by policy makers and sufficient attention is not being paid to the public involvement in military parades, and the performance of the military band and Corps of Drums at civil events and for the general entertainment of the public.

### *Development*

All arms of the military have a major developmental role in small developing countries. It can be argued that the coastguard in its operation mode enhances economic growth by ensuring that only domestic vessels or those with special permits are allowed to fish in the exclusive economic zone and the catch and/or rent are returned to the country to contribute to its GDP.

However, there is much opportunity for the involvement of the army in assisting the government in achieving its developmental goals. Because of its structure and the discipline of personnel, both infantry and engineering units are best suited for construction and other activities

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in remote areas. A critical element is the administrative and logistic structure which is inherent in the military and this provides only the military with the capability to operate in adverse environment. In Jamaica there is a much greater role for the military to play in the construction of both economic and social infrastructure and because of the military service support elements; these works should be completed at significantly less cost than when executed by civilian contractors.

A silent though possible major and significant role of the military in economic development is the provision of cadres of well disciplined persons with leadership and management skills, crafts and professions to satisfy some of the human capital needs of development integrated into society. The military, by its mere nature and design should have “planned attrition”, as the demands of the high intensity of the activities of the core functions are limited in general by rank and age<sup>10</sup>. Thus there ought to be a regular turnover of youths having served from three to eight years. In addition to their leadership and management skills, the military can develop resettlement programmes, so that on being honourably discharged from the services they would be equipped with developmental and professional skills.

In Guyana the Agriculture Corps of the Guyana Defence Force made significant contributions to national development as they were not only able to provide outputs to satisfy the demands of the military, but sufficient products were produced to supply government institutions such as the prison and hospitals.

Benoit (1973) in a frequently cited study finds a positive correlation between military expenditure and economic growth for a sample of developing countries during the period 1950-1965. He suggests that this result might be due to demand stimulus caused by military expenditure, the generation of externalities, the provision of basic consumer goods by the military, and the attractiveness to foreign investors of countries with high levels of military expenditures. He also pointed out negative effects, such as the transfer of investment funds to the military. This study, however, was criticised for the simplistic nature of the econometrics, which is based on a very basic description of the effects of military on growth (Deger, 1990). In particular it does not model the displacement effect of military spending.

### *Disaster Preparedness, Response, and Emergency Management*

The military should be a major player in planning responses to disasters. In the aftermath there are critical roles to play such as:

- maintenance of law and order;
- evacuation and resettlement;
- management of relief;
- medical assistance;
- emergency repair to infrastructure and;
- centre management

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<sup>10</sup> The teeth arm of the military requires that their combat forces have a certain fitness level for which youth is critical, however the senior officers and ranks (warrant officers and majors and above) within these organization have less demands on their physical fitness and endurance. This is due to their command and coordinating functions.

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The training and discipline of the military make them capable of better carrying out these tasks especially when they as first responders may be victims. The discipline required under these circumstances is of a much higher order than should be expected from civilian agencies and the civil power, particularly as they and their families are equally affected by the happenings. In addition the administrative and logistic structures of the military provide it with the capability of not only supporting operations during a disaster and assisting the civil authority with their tasks, but with the capabilities of providing relief and pastoral support to the dependents.

Military personnel outside of the engineering and specialist cores should also be trained to provide certain services during a disaster, such as driving and operating requisitioned vehicles, plant and equipment.

### *Transformation*

The JDF along with its CARICOM counterparts' military need to undergo transformation so that they could better fulfil the roles and functions discussed. Greater flexibility is required of defence and security planners, and new doctrines and educational and training curricula developed to accommodate these.

Garcia-Covarrubias (2004) defines transformation as the process that anticipates natural changes in matters of military competence and cooperation through a combination of concepts, capabilities, individuals, and organisations, profitably using the nation's advantages, and protecting against asymmetrical vulnerabilities. It is significant to note that the key concept of the definition is 'anticipate natural changes', which involves recognising that there are changes that surmount the will of man, and that it is imperative, if possible, that they are forestalled. The other concept refers to "military competence and cooperation' and this is inclusive of the non-defence roles that have been discussed.

Since the invasion of Grenada in 1983, the Jamaica Defence Force has been mainly deployed patrolling in the war against drugs, on anti-crime operations, disaster relief, and political stabilisation in Haiti, but none of these contingencies involved the survival rationales that make deadly force relatively straightforward for soldiers. Thus this must be taken into consideration in transformation.

The concept and doctrine of the traditional single mission, "to maintain the territorial integrity of the state" must now be concomitant with other major missions as some of the roles discussed are converted to doctrinal missions. This is essential if the defence forces are to be more efficient, effective and relevant in the current and future environments.

## CONCLUSION

In summary, in a well-ordered state, public force suppresses private force and the effects of suppression is to create a generalized stability that sets the context within which all societal interactions take place. This in effect spills over into numerous other domains and produces many manifestations, one of which is confidence about the physical security of property in general. Lack of this confidence is responsible for greatly declining investments and economic growth in the Jamaican economy, as discussed in previous sections. This confidence can be achieved as a by-product of public suppression of private force which is a prerequisite for economic development.

In domestic policies force exerts influence on other domains of policy through the power of linkage politics (Art, 2004b). Functional linkages have resulted in Jamaica benefiting from the deployment of the military in peacekeeping missions both directly through grants from the USA and other developed countries and payments for the services provided by the troops, and indirectly through remittances and repatriation of funds by those serving. Artificial or bargaining linkages have been used recently in international politics by the USA when military assistance

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was employed as a bargaining chip to coerce the Jamaican government into supporting their objectives. One can argue that the understanding that the military is also available in domestic politics to maintain “essential services” is an artificial linkage.

Undoubtedly developing countries’ military need to be relevant not only to the security threat but to the development needs of their countries. But, this has to be achieved without compromising the combat readiness, combat capability, and most important, the coercive and deterrent powers of the state. This is best done by redesigning the organization structure and the “orbat<sup>11</sup>”, and with proper tasking which must include a priority of holding the army mainly in reserve when dealing with criminal activity. This does not mean that the Jamaica Defence Force should not assist the civil authority by supplementing the manpower shortages in the police force, but this is best accomplished through proper and creative tasking.

This paper emphasises the critical nature of security in economic and social development, and under current and future threats, the norms and social capital of soldiering are essential for the stability upon which economic development can grow.

The core roles and training of the military and the police are to complement each other in internal security operations while maintaining their distinct roles-for the military, combat capabilities and combat power. The continued establishment of the military with the appropriate transformation that have been directly and indirectly suggested in this paper is critical in resolving the major new threats such as transnational crime, ideological terrorism and the interaction of the drug trafficking-subversion-terrorism triad. The military must also be available in today’s environment to enable the country to fulfil its strategic commitments, in the case of peacekeeping and other operations.

The major missions of the military should in addition to the traditional of “maintaining territorial integrity”, now include others that will inculcate national development, resolve the new threats, emphasise national disaster preparedness and relief, and satisfy regional commitments, formal or *ad hoc* to disaster relief and security operations.

Finally, it is critical that the military maintains a very high level of CRFD so that they can deal with extremely stressful and psychological exacting situations, which is more important in the current complex security environment that they will be most likely to be operating in. This environment for Jamaica with the threat of narco-terrorism, the militarisation of criminal activities, and the demand for participation in peacekeeping and stabilisation operations necessitates that the JDF demonstrates the capability and capacity of inflicting maximum force while demonstrating the restraint dictated by complex rules of engagement. To meet that challenge soldiers must embody in addition to virtues that would be expected of the police, the classic military virtues of integrity, extremely high physical and moral courage, fortitude, and “audacity coupled with restraint<sup>12</sup>”. The “release aggression, restrain excess” paradox within the state’s exercise of its monopoly over the legitimate use of force is a critical component of CRFD. This paper has argued that it is not that the police are incapable of demonstration of these virtues, but that they are in the absence of continual training incapable of doing so at the levels required by the most extreme security situations. On the other hand the nature of standard traditional police operations demands other kinds of virtues that the military by virtue of its discipline is incapable of exercising.

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<sup>11</sup> Order of battle, however this now relates more to the structure of the force when deployed on individual security operates.

<sup>12</sup> Casey(1999)

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