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Rethinking U.S. Foreign Policy in Haiti: An Engaged Ally Approach

By Noah Roisum



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Cover Credit: According to reports from various international organizations, violent gangs control more than 80 percent of Haiti's capital Port-au-Prince and more than 50 percent of the national territory.

Credit: Prensa Latina

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Introduction

Haiti is in a state of chaos. The former French slave colony and Caribbean geopolitical hotspot has perpetually suffered from external oppression, economic exploitation, political assassinations, natural disasters, diseases, authoritarianism, and poverty. Today, it is ravaged and controlled by vicious gangs caught in a turf war, that terrorize, abuse, and murder at whim. This nightmarish reality is compounded by a corrupt, weak government that is more interested in retaining power and lining its pockets than helping the brutalized Haitian populace. Ultimately, Haiti, on the brink of state failure, will not recover until its internal security crisis and lack of good, legitimate governance are remediated.

The Haitian population remains at the mercy of the country's political leaders, violent criminals, and international actors. It is difficult for an arguably failed state to pick itself off the ground without any external intervention. While prominent Haitian civil society groups have unanimously called for a Haitian-led solution, the international community has deployed a Kenya-led multinational police force to deploy to Haiti. Until its recent pledge of \$300 million to the proposed force, the United States had taken a relatively laissez-faire foreign policy approach to Haiti, ultimately seeking to avoid accusations of imperialist interventionism. Other Western powers have primarily taken the same approach. Unfortunately, there are some significant flaws in the proposal for a Kenya-led multinational police force. As daily headlines exhibit, the approach to Haiti thus far has not been getting the job done.

The United States has four primary foreign policy options. First, it could continue to support the proposed plan of a Kenya-led multinational police force. The pros of this option are that it does not require the United States to take the lead, and it holds at least temporary potential to address Haiti's issue of first importance: rampant insecurity. The glaring cons are that it makes no effort to address any of the underlying issues that have produced Haiti's current imbroglio and that Kenya's police force is known for its grave human rights abuses.

Second, the United States could stick with the laissez-faire approach it has pursued over the past few years, mainly focusing on financial aid and sanctions. The undeniable pros of this option are that the United States would avoid the type of costly mistakes it has made and that it would involve supporting a fully Haitian-led solution. The cons include the dangers of sending money to corrupt officials and the elite and the Haiti government's proven ineffectiveness.

Third, the United States could take an interventionist approach, which would involve invading and occupying Haiti in a manner not dissimilar to what it did in the early 20th century. The pros of this

approach would be near-immediate stability and the propagation of a U.S. friendly government. The cons include what would be a gross violation of Haitian sovereignty and engaging in an obvious parallel to what was costly, drawn out, and immensely complicated operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Fourth, the United States could take a multifaceted “engaged ally” approach to extricate the best of the previous three approaches and address the underlying issues to lead to long-term, positive change. In short, this approach acknowledges the unique capacity of the United States and its allies to bring about change in Haiti while still prioritizing a Haitian-led solution. It also views the United States primarily as Haiti’s ally rather than its puppeteer.

The engaged ally approach would consist of four initiatives. First, it would employ the full array of the United States’ instruments of national power, sans military, to provide unequivocal support for the Montana Accord. This prominent civil society organization spans every primary sector of Haitian society and has provided a game plan for a promising transitional government. The United States would formally recognize the Montana Accord as Haiti’s legitimate transitional government and encourage its allies to do the same.

Second, it would replicate the conditional aid of the Merida Initiative, incentivizing positive changes on the part of the Haitian government and providing accountability on behalf of American taxpayers. Third, it would call for a joint OAS-Haitian investigation into corruption in the Haitian National Police and government in return for U.S. aid in needed training, equipment, and salary bonuses for the HNP. Fourth, it would coordinate a multinational team of special operations forces (SOF) upon the request of the transitional government to retake critical infrastructure points from the chokehold of the gangs.

The pros of the engaged ally approach include the realization of stability in Haiti without the costliness or diplomatic nightmares of a full-on invasion or the painful ineffectiveness of the proposed Kenya-led multinational force and the past laissez-faire approach. It also shows long-term consideration for the U.S. soft power in the region and sustainability. The primary con is that the approach’s effectiveness is largely contingent upon the first initiative: the transition of power to the Montana Accord or a similar group.

Based upon the above considerations, it is recommended that the United States take the engaged ally approach to foreign policy in Haiti. Its theoretical framework demonstrates a level of promise, nuance, and sustainability that none of the other courses of action account for. It is the map that could finally foster lasting stability and growth in Haiti.

Before implementation, each of the engaged ally approach’s initiatives would be sent to the consortium of US policy experts, analysts, and academics for adjustment and amendment. This process of amending and adjusting would continue after implementation until the goal of stability through good, legitimate governance in Haiti is realized. Ideally, Haiti would have a transitional government and each of the four initiatives would be in full force within twelve months. Communication and collaboration with the leaders of the Montana Accord would be continual, empowering Haitian leaders to lead throughout the

process.

Contextual Overview

Since well before its official statehood, the Republic of Haiti has continually been the victim of a plethora of crises spanning the political, economic, social, and natural realms. Haitian history has been dotted with tragedies, including exploitation at the hands of the Spanish and French colonial empires, a bloody revolution and civil war, extortionate reparation payments required by France, an American occupation, the brutal Duvalier “Papa Doc” and “Baby Doc” dictatorships, floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, cholera outbreaks, economic hardship, and continual social and political instability.¹ Unfortunately, the situation in the small Caribbean republic is no better today, and the United States has yet to develop an effective foreign policy response.

Since the July 7, 2021 assassination of then-President Jovenel Moïse, Haiti has been engulfed in a state of chaos mainly attributable to the near collapse of every major political institution, the total lack of elected officials, rampant corruption, and (until mid-March 2024) the unconstitutional perpetuation of Prime Minister Ariel Henry’s term. Horrific urban warfare expressed through the vehicle of gang violence has dramatically exacerbated the situation, resulting in widespread trauma and fear amongst the population, the collapse of educational initiatives and economic activities, and increasing attempts at vigilante justice. Many experts describe Haiti as a failed state, which is defined by Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation as “that whose political or economic system has become so weak that the government is no longer in control.”² This dismal characterization will not and cannot be remediated until Haiti’s internal security concerning gang violence is addressed and the state lays the foundation for good, legitimate governance. This paper explores and proposes how the United States should shape its foreign policy to help bring about these ends.

Background

Roughly 200 gangs roam Haiti, over a hundred of which have brought the capital, Port-au-Prince, to its knees. Many of the most potent gangs have formed alliances and coalitions, the two main ones being the G9 and Fanmi e Alye, led by Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier, the infamous former police officer, and the GPèp la, led by a man known as Ti Gabriel. Gangs control over half of Port-au-Prince and govern many aspects of daily life for those living in their communities, including access to education, medical care, and jobs.³

The Haitian government has lost critical infrastructure to gangs, including major roads in and out of the capital, ports, oil refineries, grain storehouses, commercial and industrial districts, and the area surrounding Port-au-Prince’s international airport. The gangs often claim to be champions of the people

¹ “Timeline: Haiti’s History and Current Crisis, Explained.” January 26, 2023, <https://concernusa.org/news/timeline-haiti-history/>.

² “Examining Policy Responses Toward Failed States, Civil Wars,” FSI, October 7, 2016, <https://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/news/policy-responses-examined-failed-states-civil-wars>.

³ Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Haiti in 2023: Political Abyss and Vicious Gangs,” Brookings, February 3, 2023, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2023/02/03/haiti-in-2023-political-abyss-and-vicious-gangs/>.

fighting against the corrupt elite. “Barbecue,” in particular, is known for his propensity to declare such things. However, their turf wars frequently include indiscriminate and random violence against innocent civilians. Murder, rape, kidnappings, arson, and extortion occur at alarmingly high rates daily. In 2022 alone, over one thousand two hundred kidnappings and one thousand six hundred murders were reported.⁴ The real numbers are likely much higher.

Beyond their turf wars, non-state armed groups have played a key role in Haitian politics ever since the rule of President François “Papa Doc” Duvalier in the 1950s. Papa Doc and his presidential successors have continually viewed non-state armed groups as a sort of personal militia useful for instilling terror and compliance in the population, as well as providing insurance against mass protests, coups, insurrections, and any form of legitimate accountability. Though former prime minister Ariel Henry lacked respect amongst the gangs, former president Jovenel Moïse was known for his ties with the armed groups, “allegedly assist[ing] in massacres by providing gangs with government support in Port-au-Prince, including La Saline.”⁵

In 2018, La Saline, a neighborhood in Port-au-Prince that played a leading role in organizing protests against Moïse, was the scene of the worst massacre in Haiti in decades. Two senior officials from Moïse’s administration reportedly met with Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier in the weeks before the attack, allegedly to plan and provide resources for the massacre. Over fourteen hours on November 13-14, “the assailants systematically extracted victims, including children, from their homes and executed them at gunpoint and with machetes. Bodies were burned, dismembered, and disposed of in trash piles. At least 71 people were killed, 11 women were raped, and 150 homes were looted and destroyed.” Despite domestic and international outrage, Moïse failed to condemn his subordinates’ role in the attack or support their prosecution.⁶

Though the gangs are still deeply intertwined with the government and the police force, experts worry that they are becoming an increasingly influential force in their own regard. Their attraction to young people is growing, providing organization around the pursuits of wealth and power rather than mere political ideology.⁷ The presence of increasingly independent, armed factions creates escalated risks of infighting and violent attempts to seize power. While this is a growing concern, gangs remain strongly connected with government officials and law enforcement authorities, presenting one of the most formidable obstacles to effective policy solutions. Business owners also testify to the informal requirement of supporting certain gangs as a defensive measure to enable the movement of merchandise and the protection of their businesses.⁸

⁴Felbab-Brown, “Haiti in 2023.”

⁵Summer Walker and Maria Velandia, publication, *Gangs of Haiti: Expansion, Power, and an Escalating Crisis*, October 2022 (Geneva, Switzerland: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2022), 7.

⁶Summer Walker and Maria Velandia, publication, *Gangs of Haiti: Expansion, Power, and an Escalating Crisis*, October 2022 (Geneva, Switzerland: Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2022), 7.

⁷Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic and The Observatoire Haïtien des crimes contre l’humanité. *Killing with Impunity: State-Sanctioned Massacres in Haiti* (Cambridge, MA: President and Fellows of Harvard College, 2021), 3.

⁸Clare Ribando Seelke and Karla I. Rios, rep., *Haiti: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy* (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2023), 6.

Ultimately, the gangs are more powerful and feared than the Haitian government itself. Former Prime Minister Henry himself was forced to pay money to gang leaders to obtain permission to attend an event or hold a ceremony, though authorities frequently are denied access.⁹ Time and again, citizens have seen that the gangs hold ultimate sway in their neighborhoods, and the government has zero intention, let alone capability, of effectively intervening.

Max Weber, the famous German sociologist, provided one of the most well-known and accepted definitions of the state when he identified it with a “monopoly of legitimate violence” in society.¹⁰ Without such a monopoly, the state can be seen neither as legitimate nor capable of protecting state security interests. The Haitian state has no such monopoly on the use of force, both due to its incapability and unwillingness to claim it, and Haitian citizens bear the consequences of this reality every day.

Insecurity and violence propelled and carried out by non-state actors thrive in Haiti due to the lack of legitimate and good governance. According to Princeton University, “legitimacy is commonly defined in political science and sociology as the belief that a rule, institution, or leader has the right to govern.”¹¹ The last ten senators in Haiti’s parliament left office in January 2023, leaving the country without any remaining democratically elected officials. None of the institutional architecture contained in its constitution is currently in place, relegating it to more of a formality than an institutional roadmap. Henry’s interim government has remained in power for over a year past the previously scheduled 2022 elections, and no elections are currently on the horizon. Due to the above factors, most Haitian people viewed Prime Minister Henry’s administration as highly illegitimate.¹² Solving a dire internal security crisis becomes extremely difficult when the state lacks legitimacy and subsequently a monopoly on the use of force.



Caption: Many Haitians survive off the informal economy but have little financial resilience to shocks from natural disasters or criminal violence.

Credit: United Nations

⁹ Ellen Ioanes, “Haiti’s Gang Violence Crisis, Briefly Explained,” Vox, March 26, 2023, <https://www.vox.com/world-politics/2023/3/26/23657163/haitis-gang-violence-crisis-explained>.

¹⁰ Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty* (Random House, 2012), 80.

¹¹ Ian Hurd, “Legitimacy,” Princeton University, accessed June 26, 2023, <https://pesd.princeton.edu/node/516>.

¹² Luke Taylor, “Haiti Left With No Elected Government Officials as it Spirals Towards Anarchy,” *The Guardian*, January 10, 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jan/10/haiti-no-elected-officials-anarchy-failed-state>.

Additionally, Haiti's lack of legitimate governance is complemented by its absence of good governance. According to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, "Good governance is the process whereby public institutions conduct public affairs, manage public resources, and guarantee the realization of human rights in a manner essentially free of abuse and corruption, and with due regard for the rule of law."¹³ The Haitian state's ties with the gangs, support of human rights abuses and total disregard for the rule of law regarding the crimes of its officials are all blatant examples uniformly demonstrating the need for the development of good governance in Haiti. The country's comprehensive governance crisis is inextricably linked to its internal security crisis, and the two must be solved to bring about lasting, positive change.

Current Policy Situation

The Haitian government is doing little in response to the country's internal security crisis. While the Haitian National Police (HNP) continues to wage war against the gangs, it is woefully under-resourced and suffers from widespread corruption. Like every institution in Haiti, the police force is highly infiltrated by criminal networks. Low-grade officers paid less than \$200 (£162) a month are easily bought off by warlords while senior government officials sometimes commandeer units to wage warfare on behalf of gangs, noted one observer."¹⁴ The police are noticeably absent in gang-controlled neighborhoods and citizens frequently express frustration over collusion between the authorities and gangs.¹⁵ Additionally, more than 3,000 officers have left the force since 2021 for fear of being killed.¹⁶

In practicality, there is little the HNP can do in response to the gangs that are better funded and better armed. Edvie Boursiquot, an HNP veteran of 14 years, told the New York Times, "We need to go to work knowing that we have a government that supports us, that it is looking out for us. That we are given what we need to fight the gangs: better arms, better motorcycles."¹⁷ Despite the genuine efforts of many, the HNP's lack of support from upper-level officials and its widespread internal corruption continue to prohibit an effective offensive against the gangs.

¹³ "OHCHR and Good Governance." OHCHR. Accessed June 27, 2023. <https://www.ohchr.org/en/good-governance#:~:text=Good%20governance%20is%20the%20process,for%20the%20rule%20of%20law>.

¹⁴ Luke Taylor, "Haitian Cops Are Poorly Paid and Outgunned – and Part of the Problem," The Guardian, February 2, 2023, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/feb/02/haiti-cops-outgunned-gangs>.

¹⁵ Walker and Velandia, 14-15.

¹⁶ Taylor, "Haitian Cops."

¹⁷ Maria Abi-Habib, "As Gangs' Power Grows, Haiti's Police Are Outgunned and Underpaid," The New York Times, October 26, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/10/26/world/americas/haiti-police-gangs.html>.



Caption: Until 2017, when the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) operations concluded, Brazilian peacekeepers patrolled Cité Soleil, a notoriously dangerous slum on the outskirts of Port-au-Prince, Haiti. During MINUSTAH (2004-2017), crime rates dropped substantially. **Credit:** UN Photo/Pasqual Gorriz, February 2010.

Prior to his resignation in March 2024, Prime Minister Henry had urgently called for international military assistance to help quell the security crisis for over a year. However, up until Kenya pledged to lead a multinational team of police officers in October 2023, external actors have been reluctant to commit troops. Past interventions in Haiti have had mixed results, reducing violence but failing to establish long-term governance systems, including a U.N. peacekeeping mission that included widespread sexual violence against civilians and a cholera outbreak. Haiti’s neighbors in the Western hemisphere have understandably shown considerable restraint against the prospect of engaging in an invasive operation that risks repeating past mistakes. Haitian civil society groups also voiced strong opposition to military intervention, claiming that sending troops would bolster Henry’s administration and connote a degree of legitimacy that would enable him to continue to ignore the opposition.¹⁸

United States:

Throughout the last couple of years, the Biden administration has made it clear that a full-blown military intervention is precisely the type of exercise it wants to avoid engaging in.¹⁹ Canada and Brazil, two other top contenders for leading an intervention, have also been reluctant to step in. Vanda Felbab-Brown, writing for the Brookings Institution, articulated the immense difficulties that would confront a foreign military intervention:

The foreign intervention would have to operate in the worst of battlefields: urban slum labyrinths, with minimal knowledge of Haiti’s physical and human terrain and limited strategic and tactical intelligence on the gangs. In the shantytowns, international forces would struggle to distinguish civilians from gang members. The risk of gangs using

¹⁸ Jillian Kestler-D’Amours, “Haitians Push for Local Solutions as Insecurity and Violence Soar,” Politics News | Al Jazeera, October 12, 2022, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/10/12/haitians-push-for-local-solutions-as-insecurity-and-violence-soar>.

¹⁹ Michael Crowley, Michael D. Shear, and Eric Schmitt, “Biden Administration Shows Little Appetite for Haiti’s Troop Request,” The New York Times, July 10, 2021, <https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/10/us/politics/biden-haiti-troop-request.html>.

civilians as shields and thus perpetrating civilian casualties would be high.²⁰

Throughout the past few years, the United States has continued to support Haiti through financial aid channels. The FY2023 budget includes \$274.8 million allocated to Haiti in foreign assistance and \$291.5 million in FY2024. The United States has also given Haiti over \$130 million in humanitarian aid since the beginning of FY2022. Perhaps more significantly, in March 2023, the Biden administration included Haiti in its Global Fragility Act (GFA), which includes ten-year strategic plans to promote stability and prevent conflict in ten priority countries.²¹ Ultimately, the GFA looks to give US aid a long-term, strategic focus rather than continuing to rely on sporadic and short-sighted initiatives. It also aims to address the underlying drivers of violence, such as weak economic and human development, rather than over-reliance on military operations.²²

The United States' relatively hands-off approach to policy in Haiti since Henry's rise to power has been interpreted by many opposition leaders as support for the Henry administration and, therefore, support for the status quo. Many Haitians believe Henry was effectively installed by Western powers due to his official support from the Core Group, which includes the United States, Canada, Brazil, the European Union, and the Organization of American States. Support from such heavyweights has undoubtedly bolstered his regime, but it has arguably hurt him at home. Haitians are worn from continually feeling that external actors dictate their sovereign decisions.²³



Caption: The Honorable Michele Sison, U.S. Ambassador to Haiti gives a press brief to the media in Port-au-Prince, Haiti on August 26, 2021. Behind her is the administrator for U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Samantha Power, the Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, Admiral Craig Faller, and then-Haitian Prime Minister Ariel Henry. The U.S. Joint Task Force-Haiti deployed quickly to support USAID and enable airlift capability to deliver humanitarian aid to remote location in the southern peninsula of Haiti. **Credit:** U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Army (photo by Staff Sgt. Timothy Clegg)

²⁰ Felbab-Brown.

²¹ Seelke and Rios, Haiti, ii.

²² Keith Mines, "Can a New U.S. Plan Finally Give Haiti the Long-Term Framework It Needs?," United States Institute of Peace, April 5, 2022, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/04/can-new-us-plan-finally-give-haiti-long-term-framework-it-needs>.

²³ Scott Neuman, "Ariel Henry Is Set to Be Haiti's New Prime Minister. Here's What to Know about Him," NPR, July 20, 2021, <https://www.npr.org/2021/07/20/1018280279/ariel-henry-swearing-in-haiti-new-prime-minister>.

Additionally, substantive accusations were brought against Henry in September 2021, alleging that he played a key role in President Moïse’s assassination. After Haiti’s top prosecutor asked the Justice Minister to formally charge Prime Minister Henry, Henry quickly fired both officials. The United States dismissed the accusations despite further corroborative evidence having been discovered by the New York Times through phone records and an exclusive interview.²⁴

Ultimately, the United States foreign policy toward Haiti has shifted in the past couple of years from outright support of the Henry administration to encouraging dialogue and negotiations between Henry, civil society groups, and other key stakeholders.²⁵ Specifically, the United States has called for the enforcement of the December 21 Accord,²⁶ which lays out a roadmap for a transitional government and elections by the end of 2023. The accord was signed by then-Prime Minister Henry, as well as various key players in Haitian politics, business, and civil society, but its contents have thus far not been acted on.²⁷ The United States has also imposed sanctions, asset freezes, and arms embargos on several members of the corrupt Haitian elite, financial backers of gangs, and Jimmy “Barbecue” Chérizier.²⁸

In recent months, a critical move has been made as the U.N. Security Council approved a resolution drafted by the United States and Ecuador to send a Kenya-led multinational armed force to combat gangs in Haiti.²⁹ While the United States has backed calls for such a force, it never entertained leading it. Nairobi courts repeatedly delayed the mission, and specifics on the size of the mission, when it will be deployed, rules of engagement, and exit strategy remain undetermined.³⁰ The first contingent of Kenyan police arrived in Haiti on June 26, 2024.

Rationale for Policy Remediation

The situation in Haiti is dire. Rampant insecurity and the lack of governance have created one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. Prime Minister Henry resigned on March 12, 2024, as gangs took over large parts of the capital and demanded his ouster. To put it plainly, the US policy approach of the last few years is insufficient. There is very little it can bring about solely through its means. While any lasting solution must be Haitian-led, the existence of any solution depends on the assistance and support of external actors. This assistance must be more than tossing money at a corrupt Haitian government that is arguably no longer controlling the country. It also must consist of more than playing ping pong with platitudes amongst the international community. Haiti does not need the United States to dictate its sovereign decisions, but it does need some substantive support and assistance as it looks to

²⁴ Maria Abi-Habib and Natalie Kitroeff, “Haiti Opposition Group Calls on U.S. to End Support for Current Government,” *The New York Times*, February 6, 2022, <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/06/world/americas/haiti-opposition-group-montana-accord.html>.

²⁵ Seelke and Rios, ii.

²⁶ Seelke and Rios, 11.

²⁷ Keith Mines, “Have Haitians Finally Found the Formula for Moving Forward?,” *United States Institute of Peace*, March 22, 2023, <https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/have-haitians-finally-found-formula-moving-forward>.

²⁸ Seelke and Rios, 16.

²⁹ “UN Security Council Approves Sending Forces to Haiti to Fight Violent Gangs,” *POLITICO*, October 2, 2023, <https://www.politico.com/news/2023/10/02/un-security-council-approves-sending-forces-to-haiti-to-fight-violent-gangs-00119593>.

³⁰ Amanda Coletta and Widlore Mérancourt, “U.N. Authorizes Kenya-Led Force for Haiti; Key Questions Remain,” *The Washington Post*, October 2, 2023, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/10/02/haiti-security-council-kenya-gangs/>.

regain its footing.

Unfortunately, the recently approved multinational armed force, though it seeks to provide this support and assistance, lacks promise at effectively getting the job done as it models itself after a myriad of past failed missions. Repeated ineffective initiatives demonstrate a significant need for urgent remediation of US foreign policy toward Haiti. For the sake of objective analysis, we will examine four potential US foreign policy alternatives regarding the Haiti imbroglio.

Multinational Force Approach

One option for US policymakers is to continue to support the Kenya-led multinational police force to Haiti. The UN Security Council authorized a one-year mission with a review scheduled nine months in. Funding for the operation is voluntary by UN member states, with the United States already having pledged \$100 million.³¹ The mission aims to protect critical Haitian infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, ports, and airports, and collaborate with the HNP on “targeted operations.” Thus far, Kenya has pledged 1,000 security personnel, with several other countries expected to join the effort.³²

The most significant advantage to the Kenya-led multinational force approach is that it should temporarily improve the anarchic security situation in Haiti. This is critical, as securing key infrastructure points is a vital objective within the broader goal of re-establishing a functioning society. Political scientists Pablo Hernandez-Lagos, Sebastián Mazzuca, and Ernesto Dal Bó address this point in their work on the “paradox of civilization,” articulating the necessity of balancing the pursuits of producing prosperity and protecting prosperity. They contend that the issue of first importance for failed states is not new rules but power. In their own words: “failed states do not prosper because, without security, prosperity exacerbates conflict.”³³ This approach recognizes that reality. Beyond addressing the dire security situation, another undeniable pro to the Kenya-led multinational force approach from the United States perspective is that the United States would be off the hook from taking the lead.

³¹ Coletta and Mérancourt, “U.N. Authorizes Kenya-Led Force for Haiti; Key Questions Remain.”

³² Frances Robles and Farnaz Fassihi, “U.N. Approves Kenya-Led Security Mission to Help Haiti Stamp out Gangs,” *The New York Times*, October 2, 2023, <https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/02/world/americas/un-kenya-mission-haiti.html#:~:text=The%20United%20Nations%20Security%20Council,many%20on%20the%20Caribbean%20nation>

³³ Pablo Hernandez-Lagos, Sebastián Mazzuca, and Ernesto Dal Bó, “Failed States and the Paradox of Civilisation: New Lessons from History,” CEPR, July 26, 2016, <https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/failed-states-and-paradox-civilisation-new-lessons-history>.



Caption: UN peacekeepers conduct a patrol in the volatile neighbourhood of Bel Air in the Haitian capital, Port-au-Prince in April 2004.

Credit: United Nations , MINUSTAH/Sophia Paris

That said, some potential pitfalls come with the Kenya-led multinational force approach. The first and most glaring issue is that it does not attempt to address the underlying issues that have contributed to the current situation. In medical terms, the Kenya-led force wants to stick a band-aid on a bullet wound, when in reality, Haiti needs a far more serious operation. Once the force has left the island, what is to prevent the same broken institutions from wreaking the same havoc? Until the underlying issues are addressed, insecurity will continue to run rampant.

Second, the Kenyan police are known for their track record of human rights abuses, including firing on protestors and extrajudicial killings.³⁴ According to an Amnesty International 2023 Report: “Security forces continued to enjoy impunity for extrajudicial killings, unlawful killings and enforced disappearances. The right to peaceful assembly was violated, with at least 57 protestors killed by the authorities in an attempt to suppress dissent. The authorities failed to take measures to protect the right to life. Trials of police officers accused of unlawful killings were repeatedly delayed.”³⁵ Further, since the proposed force would not be a U.N. force, Kenyan police officers would be free from any oversight or accountability from a U.N. commander.³⁶

Finally, a group of Haitian-American elected officials has warned that sending a multinational force without addressing the other prevailing issues will lead to more problems in the long run. In their words, “Any military intervention supporting Haiti’s corrupt, repressive, unelected regime will likely exacerbate its current political crisis to a catastrophic one... It will further entrench the regime, deepening Haiti’s

³⁴ Nimi Princewill et al., “Kenya Police to Take on Haiti Criminal Gangs amid Criticism of Their Human Rights Record,” CNN, October 3, 2023, <https://www.cnn.com/2023/10/03/africa/kenya-multinational-force-haiti-intl/index.html>.

³⁵ Amnesty International, Kenya report, link: <https://www.amnesty.org/en/location/africa/east-africa-the-horn-and-great-lakes/kenya/report-kenya/>

³⁶ Al Jazeera, “Scepticism, Uncertainty, Hope: Haitians React to Possible Kenya-Led Mission,” Al Jazeera, August 4, 2023, <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/8/4/scepticism-uncertainty-hope-haitians-react-to-possible-kenya-led-mission>.

political crisis while generating significant civilian casualties and migration pressure.”³⁷ In this situation, a rash, unthought-out attempt to help, such as the proposed multinational force, could make the situation exceedingly worse than it already is.

Laissez-Faire Approach

A second option for US policymakers is to continue down the natural path it has worn out over the past few years and maintain a laissez-faire approach to foreign policy in Haiti. This option should not be misinterpreted as the United States doing nothing regarding Haiti. Instead, it is the most “hands-off” approach when balanced on the spectrum of alternatives. At its core, this strategy would focus on sustaining and enhancing the two primary approaches the United States has already taken in Haiti. First, the United States would continue to direct finances for Haiti’s benefit, providing foreign aid and imposing sanctions on deserving actors. Money talks, and the United States would continue to leverage all of the soft power that comes with it by building on its many already-established financial initiatives. Second, the United States would continue its attempts to mobilize the international community. This would look much like it already has, including rallying foreign aid and encouraging the organization of conferences and summits. In sum, the goal of this approach is to meaningfully support Haiti but to do so safely from the sidelines.

There would be several benefits to taking a laissez-faire approach to foreign policy in Haiti. First, and perhaps most importantly, the United States would safely avoid making well-meaning mistakes that might come with a more intrusive intervention in Haiti, as has been the case so many times in the past. This is undoubtedly, and rightfully, a major priority for US policymakers. Second, the United States should make the right move to promote a fully Haitian-led solution to the crisis. History has shown in countries across the globe that lasting solutions are local solutions. Attempting to commandeer the driver’s seat from a position that does not fully understand culture, history, and customs is dangerous. A laissez-faire approach would help ensure that Haitians ultimately solve Haiti’s problems, promoting a greater sense of national unity and lasting popular support. Finally, a laissez-faire approach would allow the United States to play some role in “doing the right thing” and helping Haiti recover.

There would also be several problems with taking a laissez-faire foreign policy approach in Haiti. First, as previously mentioned, US neutrality, and arguably passivity, has been viewed by the Haitian opposition as support for the status quo. In an ironic twist, sides have been taken by attempting not to take sides. Second, a laissez-faire strategy that primarily relies on financial assistance raises the question of whether the recipients of such substantial amounts of money can be trusted to allocate it honestly and wisely. With known, widespread corruption at the highest levels of Haiti’s government and elite class, there is an inherently significant risk that Haiti’s extractive institutional framework is exploiting aid money rather than managing it ethically and funneling it to those who need it.

³⁷ Rafael Bernal, “Haitian-American Leaders Call on Biden to Dump Ariel Henry,” The Hill, September 25, 2023, <https://thehill.com/latino/4222348-haitian-american-leaders-call-on-Biden-to-dump-ariel-henry/>. Emerging Voices, August 2024

Finally, perhaps most critically, a laissez-faire strategy may not get the job done. Haiti is currently at a critical juncture. Failure to act effectively and competently may likely result in Haiti's continued slide into anarchy and state failure.

Interventionist Approach

A third option for US policymakers is an aggressive, interventionist approach. First and foremost, this strategy would involve some sort of military invasion or occupation of Haiti, not dissimilar to the US invasion and occupation of Haiti from 1915-34. After seven Haitian presidents were assassinated or overthrown over five years, President Woodrow Wilson sent troops into Haiti "to restore order and maintain political and economic stability in the Caribbean" and to prevent a potential German invasion of the country.³⁸ The dynamics of this occupation, specifically Haitian frustration over American meddling, still linger in Haitian-American relations to the present day.

Under the interventionist approach, the United States would send general-purpose military forces and special operations forces (SOF) to quickly secure the country, engage in tactical urban warfare with the gangs in Port-au-Prince, and restore a tangible sense of stability and order. The next steps would be to set up a transitional government with US-approved officials, vet the HNP, and bring in American law enforcement officers to provide training as well as needed equipment and implement the rule of law with criminal penalties for corruption, bribery, and symbiotic relationships with gang members. Finally, a roadmap for elections within two years would be drafted and ratified. US troops would remain in the country until the HNP could demonstrate its ability to maintain order.

An interventionist approach to foreign policy in Haiti would undoubtedly engender a handful of significant pros. Perhaps first and foremost, the most glaring positive would be a near-immediate return to stability and order across the country. Infrastructure would be reopened and friendly forces would begin to facilitate mending the horrific humanitarian crisis. Economic activities could burgeon in earnest and Haitian political leaders who are widely supported, qualified, and have beneficent intentions would be installed. A further benefit, at least to the United States, would be that things would ultimately be done how it wants them to be done. Haitian government officials who could be counted as reliable allies would assume power.

³⁸"U.S. Invasion and Occupation of Haiti, 1915–34," U.S. Department of State, accessed June 30, 2023, <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1914-1920/haiti>.



Caption: Haitian citizens seek shelter from armed gangs.

Credit: UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

Though it would potentially be easy to see an interventionist approach as the quick and easy solution, some sinister cons lie underneath the surface. First, such an approach inherently violates Haitian sovereignty and would almost certainly cause serious damage to US relations with other states in the Western Hemisphere and around the globe. The value and sustainability of a Haitian-led solution would be dismissed entirely, risking diplomatic and P.R. nightmares for years to come and any hope of a solution with long-term effectiveness. As Dutch development expert René Grotenhuis writes in his book *Nation-Building as Necessary Effort in Fragile States*, “The challenge is to build states using domestic capacities, knowledge, and traditions. That will make the state institutions more legitimate, better rooted in society and therefore more robust – and it will corroborate identification with and ownership of the nation-state and thus legitimacy.”³⁹ This reality leads to the second con: similar approaches to US-directed state-building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have proven costly, drawn-out, immensely complicated, and arguably ineffective. What seems simple enough on the drawing board is not always the case. The point is not to delegitimize US involvement and efforts in those countries but that policymakers must think long and hard about whether they want to engage in a similarly protracted struggle with uncertain outcomes in Haiti.

An interventionist approach could also take a different path that bolsters the current government rather than setting up a transitional one. The United States, instead of Kenya, could facilitate a military intervention that frees the country from the chokehold of the gangs and liberates the national economy. Haitian civil society groups, including the prominent Montana Accord, have denounced Henry’s requests, saying that if the United States complied with Haiti’s unelected prime minister’s wishes, it would help perpetuate the power of authorities who are incapable of leading,⁴⁰ who are immensely unpopular, and who are arguably a significant part of the problem. Such an approach might bring quick stability, but it would almost certainly fail in the long run, as public discontentment would likely express itself through

³⁹ René Grotenhuis, “Nation-Building as Necessary Effort in Fragile States,” (Amsterdam University Press, 2016), <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1gr7d8r>, 79.

⁴⁰ Catherine Osborn, “Haiti’s Crisis Escalates,” *Foreign Policy*, October 14, 2022, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/10/14/haiti-crisis-violence-cholera-ariel-henry-military-intervention-us/#:~:text=Henry’s%20call%20for%20a%20foreign,according%20to%20The%20Associated%20Press>.

protests, riots, and continued insecurity into the foreseeable future.

Engaged Ally Approach

A fourth option for U.S. policymakers is to take an “engaged ally” approach that extricates the best of the multinational, laissez-faire, and interventionist approaches while addressing the underlying issues in a way none of the other alternatives do. This multifaceted approach would be marked by strategic, targeted United States engagement that aims to accomplish serious objectives in Haiti, all while prioritizing the United States’ primary function as Haiti’s ally rather than its puppeteer. In short, it recognizes the United States and its allies’ unique capacity to bring about change in Haiti while keeping Haitians at the forefront of the solution. This approach would entail four key initiatives. Each would be implemented only after careful deliberation amongst academic, governmental, military, and civil society leaders produced the most watertight, effective version of each.

First, the engaged ally approach would involve clear, unequivocal US support for the Montana Accord. The prominent civil society group’s namesake comes from the August 2021 document by the Commission for a Search to a Haitian Solution to the crisis that lays out a plan for a provisional government to take the reins from the current administration and hold elections.⁴¹ Most attractively, the Montana Accord has a concrete gameplan to get Haiti back on track as well as extensive popular support, an indispensable prerequisite for rebuilding legitimate governance in the country. According to the Council on Foreign Relations:

The Montana Accord garnered the backing of over six hundred fifty Haitian organizations and individual signatories from a diverse array of actors, including most of the major political parties, Catholic and Protestant churches, women’s and youth organizations, labor unions, chambers of commerce, human rights groups, the media, and even many of Haitian businesses and social elites.⁴²

The Montana Accord’s objectives are not strictly circumscribed by US foreign policy interests, which is good when considering legitimacy amongst the Haitian populace. It is an exceptionally well-organized effort to enact a Haitian-developed, Haitian-led solution – both of which are necessary factors when considering sustainability prospects. The group’s efforts show significant promise of rebuilding good, legitimate governance and what *Why Nations Fail* authors Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson call inclusive political and economic institutions. “Political institutions that distribute power broadly in society and subject it to constraints are pluralistic. Instead of being vested in a single individual or a narrow group, political power rests with a broad coalition or a plurality of groups.”⁴³ Likewise, “To be inclusive, economic institutions must feature secure private property, an unbiased system of law, and a provision of public services that provides a level playing field in which people can exchange and

⁴¹ “Haiti’s Montana Accord Document,” The Haitian Times, October 3, 2022, <https://haitiantimes.com/2022/10/03/haitis-montana-accord-document/>.

⁴² “A Smarter U.S. Assistance Strategy for Haiti,” Council on Foreign Relations, September 8, 2022, <https://www.cfr.org/report/smarter-us-assistance-strategy-haiti>.

⁴³ Acemoglu and Robinson, *Why Nations Fail*, 80.

contract; it also must permit the entry of new businesses and allow people to choose their careers.”⁴⁴ The Montana Accord’s stated intentions to develop institutions provide both Haitians and the international community significant hope for a safe and prosperous Haiti.

To support the Montana Accord, the United States would launch a coordinated effort to wield its various instruments of national power. The longstanding DIME framework was recently expanded to MIDFIELD represents the various instruments of national power, including military, informational, diplomatic, financial, intelligence, economic, law, and development.⁴⁵ Policy experts would direct each instrument, sans military, to elevate the Montana Accord to power.



Caption: Billions of dollars of international aid have failed to fix the deep-seated socio-economic problems in Haiti.
Credit: United Nations

While some might argue that substantive support for a political organization differing from the powers-that-be inherently carries a level of invasiveness; this strategy would be distinct from past U.S. interventions because rather than forcefully installing a puppet leader, it seeks to support an already-established Haitian organization that represents the expressed interests of the broader Haitian society. The obvious difficulty is that this initiative requires the Henry administration to cede its power. Aside from what policy experts might dream up from the MIDFIELD framework, there is one concrete switch the United States can pull to make this happen. The United States must publicly and loudly recognize the Montana Accord as the legitimate, transitional Haitian government. It then must encourage its allies to do the same. The current government does not have much influence or authority outside of what the international community grants it and the United States has the most influential voice in that community.

If this strategy were to need more hyperbolic firepower, though it would involve a greater degree of invasiveness, the United States could order psychological operations (PSYOP) in Haiti to boost support

⁴⁴ Acemoglu and Robinson, 75.

⁴⁵ “Joint Doctrine Note 1-18: Strategy,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 25, 2018, https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_18.pdf.

for the Montana Accords. In the words of USAF Colonels Frank Goldstein and Daniel Jacobowitz, “Psychological operations can promote resistance within a civilian populace against a hostile regime or be employed to enhance the image of a legitimate government.”⁴⁶ Congruous with what has been articulated above, such an operation would be justified within the engaged ally framework, as its goal would be to boost a legitimate Haitian organization to the forefront of the solution. Good, legitimate governance must return to Haiti.

Second, the engaged ally approach would model aid to Haiti after certain elements of the Merida Initiative, a security cooperation agreement between the United States and Mexico. Three of its pillars – disrupting the capacity of organized crime to operate, institutionalizing the capacity to sustain the rule of law, and building strong and resilient communities⁴⁷ – are directly applicable to the situation in Haiti. U.S. aid to Haiti should largely revolve around these three pillars, as well as continued humanitarian assistance.

Beyond these things, the key aspect of the Merida Initiative that would be replicated in US aid to Haiti would make aid money conditional to the United States’ chosen metrics. While current US policy prevents aid money from going directly toward the Haitian government until a transitional government takes power or an election is held,⁴⁸ enough unaccountable aid is still permitted through various channels that government officials and the elite class can exploit for their benefit.

In a March 2021 House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee deliberation aimed towards giving policy advice on Haiti to the Biden Administration, current chairman Michael McCaul and former US ambassador to Haiti Pamela White emphasized the need to tie US financial aid to metrics regarding governance and rule of law, pointing to the Merida Initiative as a reference. In the words of Ambassador White: “I call it drawing lines in the sand, but we need a very clear map of what, what we are expecting out of government, the Government in Haiti. And if we do not get the minimum that we are hoping out of the Government of Haiti, we need to have some conditionality.”⁴⁹ Tangible accountability in these areas is needed, or the United States will lead the way in lining the pockets of corrupt Haitian elites while failing to help the crisis in Haiti in any meaningful way.

Third, the engaged ally approach would provide needed munitions and training to the HNP conditional upon conducting a joint investigation into corruption in Haiti’s government and police force. This investigation would be co-led by the Organization for American States (OAS) and Haiti’s judicial system. The involvement of the multinational OAS would assure any singular country covertly attempting to accomplish its objectives in Haiti, while the involvement of Haiti’s judicial system would

⁴⁶ Frank Goldstein and Daniel Jacobowitz, “Psychological Operations: Principles and Case Studies,” Air University, September 1996, https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Books/B_0018_GOLDSTEIN_FINDLEY_PSYCHOLOGICAL_OPERATIONS.pdf.

⁴⁷ “The Merida Initiative,” U.S. Embassy and Consulates in Mexico, September 7, 2021, <https://mx.usembassy.gov/the-merida-initiative/>.

⁴⁸ Seelke and Rios, 12.

⁴⁹ House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, report, Policy recommendations on Haiti for the Biden Administration § (2021).

be critical both in terms of effectiveness and in popular support among the public.

Ultimately, Haiti will not see improvement as long as corruption continues to thrive and gangs enjoy widespread access to the halls of power. As part of the investigation, a no-tolerance policy would be enacted, and punitive measures ranging from fines to jail time for those contributing to a culture of corruption would be enforced. This strategy would require Haitian officials to step up, lead a cultural shift, and embrace the rule of law.

In return, the United States and a coordinated team of trusted allies would assemble a multinational team of law enforcement officers to provide intensive training to the HNP. Weak spots in the HNP would be identified and addressed through the best training measures available, though joint missions between the HNP and the multinational team would be forbidden. Aid to the HNP would be provided in the form of equipment, which would give its officers the resources they need to effectively subdue the gangs, as well as in the form of salary bonuses, which would ensure officers receive sufficient compensation to provide for their families without being bought off by gang leaders.

The fourth initiative of the engaged ally approach is to directly address the rampant insecurity in the country, but it is wholly contingent upon the prior transition of power from the Henry administration to the Montana Accord or a group of reasonable similarity. At the request of the Haitian transitional government, the United States would coordinate a multinational SOF team for the sole purpose of retaking critical infrastructure and economic focal points from gangs, including major roads, ports, petrol factories, grain storehouses, and other objects of macro-strategic importance.

Critically, this mission would maintain a strict operational focus and prohibit any form of tactical engagement outside of predetermined objectives. The multinational SOF would not be looking to entrench itself in urban warfare in the slums and neighborhoods of Port-au-Prince but rather to deliver a quick, decisive, and strategic leg up for the transitional government in its fight against the gangs. The multinational SOF would maintain joint control of the key objective points alongside the HNP until the HNP could reasonably be expected to maintain control of them by itself.

Thoughtful readers may be concerned with the possibility of mission creep in such a narrowly focused operation. What is the best way to prevent mission creep when the SOF begins to take fire from the gangs? Todd Wood, writing for the School of Advanced Military Studies, discusses the power of a framework known as Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) in inhibiting mission creep. The IPB framework includes four key steps: “defining the battlefield environment, describing the battlefield’s effects, evaluating the threat, and determining threat courses of action (COA).”⁵⁰ Establishing clear definitions and expectations of the enemy, the means, and the end goal within the IPB context will keep SOF from mission creep on a macro level. As Woods goes on to write:

While not completely reliable, predictive models allow the commander to visualize events before they happen. Mission planning will be greatly enhanced if the commander can relate

⁵⁰Todd Wood, publication, *Can IPB Eliminate Mission Creep?* (Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1997), 7

action-reaction-counteraction to the current and future situation. The IPB can provide him with the enemy COAs that will allow him to visualize the employment of troops and the results of actions.⁵¹

Mission creep in the context of an operation like this is difficult to completely avoid, but a well-defined plan by a commander with a clear vision of the mission and soldiers properly equipped with the necessary information should prevent any major drifts from the core objectives. The fact would mitigate galvanization amongst the Haitian populace against foreign forces. The multinational SOF would only deploy at the request of the transitional government, which enjoys massive support across all sectors of Haitian society. It would not be an occupation; it would be a support mission. Montana Accord leaders would pursue an aggressive messaging campaign to inform the Haitian populace of the mission and goals of the multinational SOF.

Many pros would come with an engaged ally approach. First, the United States would accomplish its objectives of restoring stability and security in Haiti through the implementation of good, legitimate governance without the monetary, personnel, and diplomatic costs of an invasion, the painful ineffectiveness of a laissez-faire approach, or the band-aid-on-a-bullet-wound mentality of the multinational force approach. Second, the United States would help in a way that shows long-term consideration toward its soft power in the region and its relationships with partners. Rather than burning future bridges through the brute-force implementation of its will, the United States would be positioning itself as a powerful and reliable ally to countries in the Western hemisphere and around the globe: roles that inevitably come with strategic advantages. Third, such an approach would ideally produce a sustainable solution in Haiti that would not require the United States to function as an indefinite caretaker as it did in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The most glaring con to the engaged ally approach is that the extent of its effectiveness is largely dependent on the success of an interim government that champions inclusive political and economic institutions, ones that employ accountability measures, such as conditional aid and joint investigations. It is also much simpler, diplomatically speaking, to provide law enforcement training and special operations support to a transitional government viewed as legitimate by most of the Haitian population.

⁵¹ Wood, *Can IPB Eliminate Mission Creep?*, 18.



Caption: One of the main problems in Haiti is rampant poverty; according to the World Bank, nearly 80% of the population is unemployed.

Credit: United Nations

Recommendation

Given the above considerations, the United States should take the engaged ally approach to foreign policy in Haiti. It provides the best avenue for accomplishing meaningful, sustainable change in Haiti through employing a wide array of instruments of national power while avoiding the type of sticky intervention that has burned the United States and many other countries in the past. It also positions the United States well among its regional and global partners as a powerful ally serious about seeing its objectives to fruition while distancing itself from becoming a puppeteer that disregards its actions' lasting local and cultural impacts. The engaged ally approach initiatives address underlying issues that are simply ignored by the laissez-faire and multinational force approaches. They also promise greater sustainability and less room for costly error than the interventionist approach.

The engaged ally approach holds promise, as it is distinct from past nation-building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq. The key here, once again, is the support of a Haitian-led solution rather than forcing the United States will, setting up proxy governments, and expecting locals to fall in line. State and nation-building as René Grotenhuis notes, must be accomplished with domestic capacities to have any hope of legitimacy and longevity. The engaged ally approach is attentive to this requirement in a way past solutions have not been.

The engaged ally approach also promises to be different from past failed UN peacekeeping missions in Haiti. Members of the multinational police force and SOF would be tightly selected, preventing soldiers or officers from forces known for human rights abuses from coming to Haiti. Importantly, the narrow focus of their missions should keep them largely out of the broader community of Port-au-Prince, mitigating the risk of abuses reminiscent of the past. Force members engaging in such behavior would be punished according to the strictest of their home country's laws.

As argued at the beginning of this paper, Haiti will not break out of the mold of state failure until it addresses its internal security crisis and lays the foundation for good, legitimate governance. While Haiti is powerless to do this independently; it must remain at the forefront of the solution. The engaged ally approach recognizes and addresses these realities in a productive, nuanced manner.

Implementation

For maximum effectiveness, each of the engaged ally approach's initiatives would be sent to the consortium of US foreign policymakers, analysts, and academics to amend and adjust as necessary. The initiatives would then be carried out by an array of US federal agencies, with two of the primary executors being the Department of State and the Department of Defense. Given the urgency of the situation in Haiti, implementation would begin as rapidly as possible and continue until the goal of stability through good, legitimate governance is realized. Should specific initiatives require amending or adjusting, or new initiatives must be introduced, this would continue until the goal is realized. Ideally, Haiti will have a transitional government within a year, and the initiatives will be in full force. As the initiatives are implemented, the United States and its involved allies will not only continually evaluate the success of the initiatives amongst themselves; they will remain in constant communication and collaboration with Montana Accord leaders, empowering Haiti's leaders to truly function.

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