Now more than ever, Latin America needs help with its security. In 2023, more than 40 of the world’s 50 most murderous cities were in Latin America and the Caribbean. Washington should again embrace the worldview that it can best protect its own security by helping democratic neighbors advance theirs. It can do so by drawing on the lessons of decades of U.S. security policy in the Americas but also by determining how those policies can be revised and improved. This article for Foreign Affairs explores the recent history of U.S. security assistance in Latin America and the Caribbean, highlighting the successes and failures in places such as El Salvador, Colombia, and Mexico. The article then addresses why such U.S. assistance continues to underdeliver, noting that the success of security assistance depends on leaders and organizations that the United States can sometimes influence but rarely control. Likewise, although the governments and security agencies on the receiving end provide convenient scapegoats when U.S. security assistance fails, Washington’s own bureaucracy shares the blame. To this end, the article concludes that Washington must remove its own bureaucratic barriers to strengthening security ties. Minimizing delivery timelines, committing to multiyear investments, and synchronizing priorities across U.S. government agencies would enhance the United States’ credibility as a reliable partner. The long history of U.S. security ties in the region provides a strong foundation for regional enthusiasm for U.S. initiatives. But whether such valuable programs can truly achieve results will depend on whether Washington can learn from past mistakes and overcome the bureaucratic and political limitations that have previously held it back.
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Latin America and the Caribbean are home to just 9 percent of the global population but account for a third of the world's homicides. A lethal mix of drugs, readily available firearms, and unemployed youth is fueling a wave of violence that has taken on epidemic proportions. Ecuador is now ground zero for the region's gang brutality. Whether Quito succeeds in containing the violence will depend as much on how it manages corruption and political instability as it does on the brute force called upon to suppress organized crime. The region's downward spiral need not be a chronicle of a death foretold. In Ecuador, newfound national resolve and emerging offers of international cooperation can be an effective antidote to expanding gang violence. Indeed, the success of one of South America's smallest countries in dismantling gangs and the corrupt institutions that protect them could be a promising start in turning the tide on Latin America's new crime wave.
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The COVID-19 pandemic has upended the post-World War II political, economic, social and international order with many questioning whether our current democratic and economic institutions are suitable for and capable of recovering from this profound health, economic and governance crisis. While democracies and open economies were hard hit by the pandemic, illicit networks including transnational criminal groups, terrorist organizations and their facilitators have proven more resilient, expanding their activities and influence in the Americas. This article will examine the impact COVID-19 has had on the health, economy, democracy, security of the region and on illicit networks. The article will conclude with recommendations on how nations incorporate strategic foresight and anticipatory governance to safeguard their sovereignty and counter to the growing threats from corruption and illicit networks in the new world order.
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In Latin America, as in every other part of the world, entrenched political corruption has proven to be extremely resistant to change, despite manifold efforts of legal reform and criminal prosecution. This paper proposes an explanation of this powerful resistance in terms of four interlocking vicious cycles. Once started, each cycle perpetuates itself and reinforces the other three. These vicious cycles involve (a) the informal economy, which drains income from the state treasury, (b) lack of transparency in international negotiations, (c) organized crime, which corrupts the judicial system; and (d) the patronage system of political appointments. Based on an examination of the dynamic behavior of the entire system we propose an explanation for why most reform efforts fail, and how a successful strategy can be constructed. Almost all of the insights reported in this paper were gained from the NationLab series of national strategic seminars in eight countries of Latin America.
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