This article examines the often contentious role that human rights promotion has played in US foreign policy in Latin America. As a longtime interloper from the North, the United States has employed many different strategies, often resulting in the election to participate in foreign countries' domestic conflicts in aid to one side or another. With regard to human rights, the fact of the matter is that the United States has failed to adopt as many human rights treaties as many other South or Central American nations have. In a globalized world more closely linked than ever before, nations are adopting human rights practices that promise to prevent injustices from occurring as they did in the past, a welcome break from the violent past in Latin America. For myriad reasons, including domestic pressures and belief in "American Exceptionalism," the United States has dodged full participation in many international legal and human rights documents, but this practice has already started to harm international cooperation with and perception of US goals abroad. The author concludes his analysis by suggesting that the United States reconsider its earlier defiance against making human rights a fully fledged tenet of its foreign policy in favor of a new, more cooperative stance.
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Does US military aid buy recipient state compliance? In this study, we systematically investigate the effects of U.S. military assistance on recipient state behavior toward the United States. We present and test three different models—Arms for Influence, Lonely Superpower, and Reverse Leverage—that might capture the relationship between military aid and recipient state cooperation. Using innovative events data that measure cooperation between the United States and recipient states between 1990 and 2004, we test seven hypotheses using a combination of simultaneous equation, cross-sectional time series, and Heckman selection models. We find, with limited exceptions, support for the Reverse Leverage model: increasing levels of US military aid significantly reduce cooperative foreign policy behavior with the United States. U.S. reaction to recipient state behavior is also counterintuitive; our results show that recipient state cooperation is likely to lead to subsequent reductions in US military assistance, rather than proving the theory of success based on a carrot and stick approach.
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